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Abstract
Separated powers cannot permanently constrain individual ambitions. Concerns about a
government’s ability to respond to contemporary and future crises, we show, invariably com-
promise the principled commitments one branch of government has in limiting the authority
of another. We study a dynamic model in which a politician (most commonly an executive)
makes authority claims that are subject to a hard constraint (administered, typically, by a
court). At any period, the court is free to rule against the executive and thereby permanently
halt her efforts to acquire more power. Because it appropriately cares about the executive’s
ability to address real-world disruptions, however, the court is always willing to affirm more
authority. Neither robust electoral competition nor alternative characterizations of judicial
rule fundamentally alters this state of affairs. The result, we show, is a persistent accumulation
of executive authority.
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This paper confronts the institutional optimism of The Federalist Papers. Broadly speaking,
the separation of powers does not meet the stated aspirations of either the Founders or the lore
that surrounds their project. In the model developed here, when the ambition of an executive is
pitted against the ambition of a court, the result is not a standoff between two coequal adversaries.
Rather, it is a political mismatch in which the executive inevitably prevails.
Politicians generally, and executive officeholders in particular, regularly assert authority that
neither a constitution nor prior statute expressly recognizes. Rather than wait on Congress, Donald
Trump has simply averred that he justifiably retains authority over immigration policy, trade, (de-
)regulation, international diplomacy, and plenty more policy domains (Milkis and Jacobs 2017).
And in this regard, at least, he is hardly exceptional. Trump’s immediate predecessors rather
brashly asserted new authority to grant conditional state waivers over federal statutes, fabricate
new tools of executive policymaking, re-interpret the meanings of laws, and expand their reach into
all manner of policy domains (Howell 2013).
In the aftermath of these interventions, the adjoining branches of government have the right to
step in and offer a corrective—and occasionally they do, amending or overturning an executive’s
unilateral directive. Commonly, though, Congress and the courts assume a very different posture.
Not only do they affirm a unilateral directive—whether by writing its contents into law, appropriat-
ing the necessary funds to implement it, or denying a complainant’s claims (Howell 2003, chapters
5-6). The adjoining branches also affirm the general right of the executive officeholder to intervene
into a policy domain, thereby remaking both a political office and the legal landscape in which it
functions.
When adjudicating disputes over presidential actions involving executive agreements, war pow-
ers, recess appointments, pardons, executive privilege, travel bans, and a wide range of other issues,
the courts not only have looked to past practice for guidance; they have inferred political author-
ity on the basis of such practice (Bradley and Morrison 2012, 2013; Levinson 2005; Levinson and
Pildes 2006). So doing, the judiciary manufactures new authority upon which future executive of-
ficeholders can act. Authority, in this sense, grows first by initiative and then by recognition. And
what previously might have been viewed as “rule-breaking” (Shepsle 2017), now becomes standard
practice.
To clarify the politics of authority acquisition, we study a dynamic model in which a politician
claims authority subject to the hard constraint of an adjoining branch of government, which we
henceforth recognize as a court. In each period, the politician has the opportunity to expand the
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scope of her authority over a unit interval, where zero indicates no authority over the matter in
question, one indicates full authority, and interior values indicate intermediate levels of authority.
Should the court affirm the claim, then the politician’s authority expands up to the point of the
claim, and all future courts are obligated to uphold claims within the affirmed domain. Should the
court reject the claim, however, the politician’s authority collapses to its previous maximum, and
all future expansionary claims are rejected.
While the politician wishes to expand her authority over the full interval, the court, strictly
as a matter of constitutional interpretation, would prefer that the politician have something less.
What the court formally sanctions, however, is a function of both its constitutional preferences,
which are constant across all periods, and exogenous shocks, which are realized each period of play,
and which stylistically represent current circumstances (the state of the economy, international
conflict, natural disasters). Depending upon the size of a contemporaneous shock, the court may
tolerate smaller or larger claims of authority. Additionally, the court worries about a decision in
one period disabling the politician from responding in the future to disruptive events or unforeseen
contingencies. Consequently, both present values of these shocks and expectations about their
future realizations cause the court to qualify its constitutional preferences over authority.
To expand her authority beyond the court’s nominal constitutional preference, the politician
exploits the court’s concerns about present and future flexibility to respond to these random dis-
turbances. Indeed, we show, even when realized shocks assume the lowest possible values (such
that any new authority claim necessarily decreases the court’s present payoff), the politician can
still expand her authority outward. This authority then grows each period so that, eventually, the
politician assumes plenary authority over the entire unit interval. These findings, which consti-
tute the central contribution of our paper, hold even though the politician starts the game with
virtually no authority whatsoever; are a feature of all equilibria; and are robust to various model
extensions, which include alternative characterizations of court precedent and the introduction of
political competition.
The model also reveals several features of the evolution of authority acquisition. In every period,
if the politician is patient enough, there exists an equilibrium in which the politician expands her
authority as far as the court will permit. And consistent with a literature on wartime jurisprudence
(Howell and Ahmed 2014; Epstein et al 2005), larger exogenous shocks induce the court to affirm
larger claims of authority. Interestingly, though, small acquisitions of authority in one period
portend larger acquisitions in the next. In some instances, moreover, these dynamics enable one
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politician with significantly less authority to overtake another politician, yielding a demonstrable
“reversal of fortunes.”
Lastly, the model reveals a weakness within a separation of powers system in constraining
executives. Precisely because a court rejection is damaging to an executive’s present and future
authority, courts are inclined not to stand in her way. The ability to administer a significant
punishment—a big club behind the door, so to speak—actually discourages the court from opposing
ever expanding authority.
We proceed as follows. The first section characterizes formal literatures that speak to the politics
of authority acquisition. The second section introduces a baseline model, while the third charac-
terizes both the features of all equilibria and the specific strategies within one that is particularly
germane to contemporary politics. The final three sections consider the relevance of both a new
judicial rule and electoral competition for authority acquisition, discuss our results, and conclude.
Proofs for all the technical results are found in the Online Appendix.
1 Literature Review
Our paper speaks to a large body of work recognizing that political manipulation by an officeholder
today affects what a successor can do tomorrow. A host of papers investigates the efforts of politi-
cians to restrict the actions of their replacements, either by increasing debt (Persson and Svensson
1989; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Milesi-Ferretti 1995a and b), over-privatizing (Montagnes and
Bektemirov 2018), constraining the information available to them (Callander and Hummel 2014),
strategically manipulating the status quo in “divide the dollar” settings (Kalandrakis 2004; Baron
and Bowen 2016; Nunnari 2019), or legislative policy-making (Bowen et al. 2014; Dziuda and
Loeper 2015; Buisseret and Bernhardt 2016). None of these models, however, expressly recognizes,
much less parameterizes, a notion of political “authority.” That a politician has a legal right to
intervene into a policy space, instead, is either assumed or treated as irrelevant.
A substantial body of work, of course, does investigate the issue of delegation. In economics,
scholars have mostly focused on how a principal can best advance her interest while delegating
decisions to better informed agents (e.g., Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe 2005; Alonso and Matouschek
2008; Amador and Blagwell 2013). A central concern in this work, much like ours, is the trade-off
between flexibility (allowing the agent to respond to present circumstances) and bias (keeping the
agent from adopting policies that deviate from the principal’s preferences). In most of these models,
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the principal can set limits on what the agent can do (for one exception, where agents themselves
commit to a certain limit, see Kartik, Van Weelden, and Wolton 2017). In our model, instead, we
show how the executive can incrementally exploit a court’s concerns for flexibility and ultimately
secure full authority over a policy domain.
In political science, numerous scholars have studied the conditions under which one branch of
government (typically Congress) will delegate authority to another (typically the executive). Its
willingness to do so, this work shows, crucially depends upon the levels of ideological convergence,
the complexity of the policy domain, and the independent costs of lawmaking (see, e.g., Epstein
and O’Halloran 1999, Huber and Shipan 2002, Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). All of this work,
however, puts a legislature firmly in the driver’s seat. Whether a president or executive agency
acquires new authority is left entirely to Congress’s discretion. These models do not so much as
recognize even the possibility that politicians within an executive branch might unilaterally claim
new authority for themselves.
In this regard, our paper is in closer conversation with Svolik (2009), Howell and Wolton (2018),
and a burgeoning literature on democratic backsliding. Like us, Svolik (2009) is interested in
the growth of a leader’s power. Unlike us, he focuses on authority acquisition in autocracy, not
democracy. As such, his leader faces the threat of a coup by the regime selectorate, whereas our
officeholder is constrained by the court. Further, Svolik imposes exogenously fixed incremental
jumps in power, whereas we allow the officeholder to choose a continuous amount of new authority.
The two works also differ in their treatment of what information is available to the leader and other
political actors when they take an action.
Howell and Wolton (2018) examine the conditions under which a politician will either request
new authority or claim it outright. In important respects, however, our paper differs from theirs.
First, we consider how authority is built over time rather than instantly. Second, we take a more
fine-grained approach to authority that allows the officeholder to claim more or less authority,
rather than only a fixed amount. Finally, we consider a setting in which a strategic judiciary
functions as a constraint, and in which a well-defined notion of “precedent” governs the judiciary’s
behavior—features, both, that are entirely missing from Howell and Wolton’s model.
Recent scholarship has started paying close attention to a perceived decline in democratic norms.
In some papers, democratic backsliding takes the form of a weakening of electoral institutions (Luo
and Przeworski 2019; Helmke, Kroeger, and Paine 2019). In others, would-be autocrats exploit
polarization (Graham and Svolik 2019; Nalepa, Vanberg, and Chiopris 2019), voters’ behavioral
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biases (Grillo and Prato 2019), or the electorate’s lack of democratic values (Besley and Persson,
2019) in order to remove checks on their power.1 In all, the focus is on the electorate’s limited
ability to constrain executive ambitions. Our paper offers a complementary, and possibly more
depressing, account–complementary because we focus on judicial constraints on the executive; and
depressing, because we establish that executive absolutism may derive not from an electorate’s
failings, but from the very design of a system of separated powers.
The presence of a strategic and forward-looking judiciary also connects our work to the formal
literature on court behavior. As in Gennaoili and Shleifer (2008), Fox and Stephenson (2011, 2014,
2015), Almendares and Le Bihan (2015), Gailmard and Patty (2017), among others, court decisions,
anticipated or issued, impose constraints on other political actors. As in Baker and Mezzetti (2012),
Fox and Vanberg (2012), Beim (2017), Clark and Kastellec (2013), and Clark (2016), the court
makes decisions while uncertain of their long term consequences. With some important exceptions,
including Fox and Vanberg (2015) and Beim, Clark, and Patty (2017), the literature assumes that
cases exogenously arise before the courts. In contrast, we suppose that the cases brought before the
court are the result of a strategic decision by a rational actor.2 We further innovate on the literature
by investigating the acquisition of authority by executives in the shadow of judicial constraint.
We set to one side the constraining weight of a legislature on executive authority, though others
have made it a central concern (see, for example, Howell 2003; Chiou and Rothenberg 2017).
Similarly, we do not explicitly account for the relevance of parties or public opinion, though they
too are the subjects of considerable scholarship. Levinson and Pildes (2007), for instance, argue it
is the fact of partisan division among the branches, more than the clout of the separate branches
themselves, that constrains executive aggression; while Christenson and Kriner (2019) find that low
public approval limits an executive’s ability to exercise existing authority or acquire new authority
unilaterally. Our intention, instead, is to hone in on the capacity of the courts, as a final line
of defense, to limit executive authority when neither Congress, traditional parties, nor the public
seem up to the job. Our findings offer little by way of reassurance.
1Some (slightly older) works provide a less gloomy picture. Lagunoff (2001) shows how tolerance can decrease
over time as the state becomes more able to monitor deviant behavior. Vigorous electoral competition, however,
provides a corrective and leads to a tolerant society. Wolitzky (2013), in turn, highlights how polarization can
actually encourage an incumbent to invest in institutional constraints to avoid too large policy swings in the future.
In our model, we show that political turnover in itself is no bulwark against executive absolutism.
2In the context of lower and upper court relationships, Carubba and Zorn (2010), Carubba and Clark (2012),
Clark and Carubba (2012), Beim, Hirsch, and Kastellec (2014), and Hu¨bert (2019) consider how a lower court may
strategically issue a judgement to avoid being overturned by an upper court. These papers generally consider a
one-shot game and cannot explain the evolution of jurisprudence over time.
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2 The Baseline Model
Our baseline model consists of a dynamic game with two players: a politician P , which we inter-
changeably refer to as politician, executive, or officeholder; and a strategic court C. In each period,
denoted by t, P asserts authority over a policy domain. To keep the model manageable, the author-
ity claimed by P is assumed to be unidimensional, and is represented at time t by at ∈ [0, 1]. We
assume that authority is finite in recognition of the limits (e.g., institutional capacity constraints,
overarching principles) on what an officeholder can do. Authority facilitates (un-modeled) actions
that advance the officeholder’s (again un-modeled) agenda. As such, in our baseline model, more
authority is always beneficial.
Authority is governed by precedent, by which we mean the prior rulings of the court C. At
the outset of period t, the court’s prior rulings have partitioned the authority space [0, 1] into
three subsets: a permissible set Rt, which consists of the authority acquired by prior court rulings;
an impermissible set Wt, also determined by prior court rulings, which limits the office-holder’s
authority; and the remainder [0, 1] \ (Rt ∪ Wt), which represents authority that remains up for
grabs and thus constitutes the court’s discretion set.
After observing the officeholder’s authority claim at, the court decides whether to uphold (dt =
0) or overturn (dt = 1) P ’s action. The court’s decision affects both the outcome of period t and
the dynamic of precedents. We discuss each in turn.
The court’s decision affects the scope of P ’s authority, which we denote yt(dt). We assume that
if the court upholds the politician’s action in period t, then P claims the full scope of authority, at.
If the court overturns the politician’s action, then (without loss of generality) we impose that P
claims the maximum of previously permissible authority. Hence, the authority acquired in period
t assumes the following form:
yt(dt) =
at if court upholds (dt = 0)maxRt if court overturns (dt = 1)
The court’s decision is constrained by past precedent on executive authority. Consistent with the
broad contours of judicial history, we assume that what has been permitted in the past cannot be
rescinded, and what has been forbidden in the past cannot be reconsidered. Thus, if in period t,
P stays within the bounds of acquired authority, the court has no choice but to uphold: dt = 0 if
at ∈ Rt. In turn, if the politician claims authority which has already been refused to her, the court
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must overturn the officeholder’s action: dt = 1 if at ∈ Wt. The court is free to evaluate the claim
of new authority only if the new authority claim belongs to its discretion set: at /∈ Rt ∪Wt.
A court ruling also introduces dynamic changes to the precedents governing authority. At the
beginning of the game, we assume that the court has discretion over almost the whole set: R1 = {0}
and W1 = ∅. For any authority claim at in the court’s discretion set (at /∈ Rt ∪Wt), if C upholds
at (dt = 0), then the permissible range of authority in period t + 1 becomes Rt+1 = [0, at], and
the impermissible range is unaffected. If, on the other hand, C overturns the authority claim, then
the permissible range remains unchanged, Rt+1 = Rt, and the impermissible range expands to
Wt+1 = [0, 1] \ Rt.
With one important caveat, our characterization of precedent evolution follows the literature
(e.g., Baker and Mezzetti 2012). As in previous papers, if at is upheld, then P accumulates
executive authority. In our baseline model, however, overreach, as determined by the court, has
severe consequences. If C determines that P has “gone too far” and rejects a claim for enhanced
authority, then parameters for authority are fixed permanently at the level previously acquired.
While we relax this assumption in Section 4 below, we want, first, to establish a baseline in which
an adverse court ruling has lasting and deleterious consequences for political authority.
Given the dynamic nature of the game, we impose that payoffs are discounted by β. To allow for
comparative statics on the discount rate without modifying other model parameters, we suppose
that 0 < β < β, with β < 1. We suppose that the officeholder always prefers more authority.
Politicians may want authority for either instrumental or intrinsic reasons, but we will have nothing
to say about the distinctive implications of one motivation or another. Instead, we simply assume
that politicians want more of it, for as Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012, p. xviii) remind us,
politics, at its very heart, “is about getting and keeping power.” Recalling that yt is the authority
acquired in period t, therefore, we assume that UP (yt) = v(yt) is strictly increasing in its argument.
We further impose that v(·) is continuously differentiable and its derivative satisfies v′(y) <∞ for
all y ∈ [0, 1].
In contrast, the judiciary may favor restrictions on executive authority for constitutional reasons.
As such, we assume that everything else equal, the optimal amount of authority from C’s perspective
is κC ∈ [0, 1]. The court’s evaluation of P ’s authority, however, is also affected by the overall
context. In certain circumstances—say, during war, a natural disaster, or a deep economic slump—
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the court may be prepared to grant legitimacy to greater exercises of authority by politicians.3 We
capture this with a random state variable, θt, which is drawn i.i.d. each period according to the pdf
f(·), and which is continuous and symmetric over the interval [−θ, θ], with associated CDF F (·).
Higher θ implies an environment more favorable to authority claims, and lower values suggest
an environment less amenable to such. In particular, we suppose that there exist exceptional
circumstances in which interventions by P are recognized as being valuable to the court and, by
extension, an (un-modeled) public. We therefore assume that θ is large and, in particular, θ > 1
1−β
.
This assumption facilitates the analysis and simplifies the characterization of equilibrium outcomes.
We do not require that extreme events are common. Indeed, it is enough that there exists an
extremely small probability that θ is large (in formal terms, we only require that F (1/(1−β)) < 1−ǫ,
with ǫ strictly positive, but potentially arbitrarily small). Given our interpretation of the state θt,
we assume that θt is observed by all players at the beginning of period t. Future circumstances
(θt+1, θt+2, ...) can only be predicted using the common prior CDF F (·).
For ease of exposition, we assume that only the court’s per-period payoff is affected by the state
of the world.4 Further, to provide some characterization of equilibrium strategies, we assume that
C’s utility takes the form of a quadratic loss function: UC(yt) = −(yt − κ
C − θt)






to convey the adjustment C makes to what it regards as “ideal”
depending on the nature of the times.
The game proceeds as follow. Each period,
0. The state, θt, is drawn by Nature and observed by both P and C. The current permissible
(Rt) and impermissible (Wt) sets are known by P and C as well.
1. Politician P chooses an authority claim at ∈ [0, 1].
2. Court C chooses whether to uphold or overturn: dt ∈ {0, 1}.
3. The authority employed is yt(dt) = dtmaxRt + (1 − dt)at, and the permissible and imper-
missible sets are amended to Rt+1 and Wt+1, if required.
4. The period t payoffs are realized and the game moves to period t+ 1.
To reduce the number of equilibria, we follow the literature on dynamic games and use Markov
Perfect Equilibrium as our equilibrium concept. In addition, we restrict attention to pure strategy
3Examples include the extraordinary authority recognized by the Supreme Court in allowing the internment of
Japanese citizens during World War II (Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)) or in permitting state
legislatures during the Great Depression to annul debt contracts and restrict property foreclosures by allowing
repayment moratoriums (Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)).
4All our results would hold if θ also figured into the executive’s utility function, provided that the executive never
wants less authority.
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equilibria. Finally, we assume that when indifferent, the court upholds the office-holder’s authority
claim. This assumption guarantees that the politician’s maximization problem is well-defined.
3 Analysis
In this section, we first describe some general properties of all equilibria of the baseline model,
with particular attention to the vulnerabilities of the judicial constraint. We then characterize the
dynamics of authority acquisition within one specific equilibrium.
3.1 All equilibria lead to executive absolutism
Given our assumed construction of precedents, the set of permissible authority claims always takes
the form of an interval. In addition, P can always lay claim to the authority she previously
acquired without any risk (dt = 0 for all at ∈ Rt), whereas, whenever C has overturned P , then
Wt 6= {∅} and Rt ∪Wt = [0, 1], so the officeholder always chooses at = maxRt. Hence, the only
relevant information for both the court and politician is the maximum of the permissible set and
the minimum of the impermissible sets.
We then can think of P ’s strategy as a mapping from the present environment, the maximum of
the permissible set, and the minimum of the impermissible set (denoting this value 1 if Wt = {∅})
into an authority claim: at : [−θ, θ]× [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. Likewise, C’s strategy maps the state,
the authority claim, the maximum of Rt, and the minimum of Wt to a ruling: dt : [−θ, θ]× [0, 1]×
[0, 1] × [0, 1] → {0, 1}. We note that, because we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibrium, the time
subscript is superfluous to define the court and executive strategies. We nonetheless keep the time
subscripts in order to highlight the period-specific strategic choices of the political actors. Recall
that by assumption, if maxRt = minWt = a, then at(θt, a, a) = a for all θt. As a result, in all
that follows, we consider the cases when the politician has not yet obtained all authority (hence
maxRt = a ∈ [0, 1)) and when the court has not overturned any politician’s claim (Wt = {∅}).
With these preliminaries, Lemma 1 below indicates that the court can act as a day-to-day
constraint on executive power (i.e., limit the scope of her authority). Each period, there is a
strictly positive probability that P is forced to restrict her authority claim if she wants to avoid
being overturned by the court.





. In any equilibrium, the court overturns a full authority claim,
dt(θt, 1, a, 1) = 1, if and only if θt < θ̂(a).
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Lemma 1 states that, for any given maximum of currently permitted executive authority, a, so
long as θt is not too large, then there are authority claims judged “excessive” by the court and
struck down. The court, as noted, can act as a day-to-day constraint on executive authority claims.
Still, the next proposition shows that in all possible circumstances (θt ∈ [−θ, θ]) there exists a set
of new authority claims (at /∈ Rt ∪Wt) that a court will not overturn.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, for all θt ∈ [−θ, θ], there exists a(θt, a) > a such that C upholds
P ’s authority claim at, dt(θt, at, a, 1) = 0, if at ∈ [a, at(θt, a)].
Proposition 1 has important substantive implications. In our baseline model, in which we have
set to one side the constraining role of the legislature, parties, electoral competition, and public
opinion, C is the only bulwark against executive absolutism. And in principle, it would appear up
to the task. With the power to set new precedents, after all, the court can put a permanent end
to the extension of executive authority. In any equilibrium, however, the court’s practical ability
to restrain the politician is limited, for the politician can always make authority claims that the
court would approve, even when the circumstances are quite unfavorable (θt = −θ).
Why is the executive always able to expand her authority, should she so choose? Here is the
key intuition. Each time it must make a decision (i.e., at /∈ Rt), the court is faced with a binary
choice: either recognize the legitimacy of P ’s encroachment or overturn it and be stuck with the
previously granted authority level forever. This generates a trade-off for the court between present
and future payoffs. On the one hand, when the state of the world is unfavorable to the executive
(θt is low), the court may be tempted to reject the authority claim whenever it induces a payoff
loss for the court today compared to the existing permissible actions. For a new authority claim
very close to the current maximum permitted authority (at very close to maxRt), however, the
court’s present payoff loss is arbitrarily close to 0. Yet, if it overturns the new authority claim,
the court loses all future chances for the executive’s authority to adapt to special circumstances
(high θ). Given that there exist states such that the court values full authority by the executive
(θ is large by assumption), the future cost of impeding flexibility by overturning a new authority
claim is always bounded away from zero.5 Hence, there always exists a sufficiently small new
authority claim for which the present cost from upholding it is dominated by the future loss from
overturning it, leading the court to sanction the increase in executive authority. Importantly, it is
5As long as extreme states are possible (θ > 1
1−β
), the cost of overturning the office-holder is bounded away from
zero for all discount factors β ≤ β, even if the court is more patient than the office-holder. Since this force is the
key force behind all our results, none of our main conclusions relies on the assumption that players are similarly
patient.
11
the court’s forward looking perspective, even as it anticipates future authority claims by P , that
allows executive authority to grow in every period, no matter the circumstances.
Anticipating the court’s strategy, the politician always chooses a new claim that is upheld by the
court. After all, if she were to go too far, she would be overturned, stuck with current precedents,
and relinquish all future opportunities to expand her authority. Hence, the politician recognizes the
benefit of waiting for more favorable circumstances in the future (this result is formally proven in
the Online Appendix). Each period, the executive makes either no authority claim or an admissible
claim–that is, one that the Court upholds. Thus, in any equilibrium, the court never punishes the
politician and the growth of executive authority only comes to a halt when it has been utterly
exhausted. Over time, the production of authority is defined by one-way “ratchets.” And in the
limit, in any equilibrium, the officeholder gains full authority over the policy domain.
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium, limt→∞Rt = [0, 1] with probability 1.
Our model highlights an important contrast between the day-to-day operation of the court and
the long-run relationship between the judiciary and the executive. On a short-run basis, we see
that the court can effectively impose limits on executive authority (Lemma 1). But this view of
judicial constraint does not tell the full story. The politician, after all, always manages to play the
court to her own advantage. She strategically chooses a new authority claim that will survive court
scrutiny. Each period, the executive can break out beyond what was previously allowed, sometimes
by a little, sometimes by a lot, but always successfully (Proposition 1). At the end of the process,
despite the judiciary fully anticipating it, the executive gains full control over the policy domain
(Proposition 2). The judiciary is thus a weak constraint on the growth of executive authority: it
can delay the onset of executive absolutism, but it does not stop it.
3.2 Features of a period-by-period maximally admissible equilibrium
There exist multiple equilibrium paths in this dynamic game. Propositions 1 and 2 cover all of
them. To investigate the dynamics of authority growth over time, however, we must select a specific
equilibrium. We focus on one in which P relies upon an intuitive strategy: she claims as much
authority as the court will allow each period–that is, the amount that leaves the court indifferent
between upholding and overturning her action. We label this equilibrium, in which executive
authority strictly increases each period, the “period-by-period maximally admissible” equilibrium.
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As the next lemma shows, this strategy is indeed an equilibrium whenever the politician does not
value the future too heavily.
Lemma 2. There exists β̂ ∈ (0, β] such that if β ≤ β̂, then an equilibrium exists in which P is
never overturned and, each period, either claims full authority (a = 1) or chooses a new level of
authority that leaves the court indifferent between upholding and overturning it.
In such an equilibrium, the politician always maximizes her present payoff by pushing her
authority as far as she can each period. The court observing P ’s behavior today and anticipating her
action tomorrow then uses a very simple strategy: it upholds if the claim is below a certain threshold
and overturns otherwise. This tolerance threshold, which we denote a(θt, a), is a function of the
upper bound on the set of already permissible claims, maxRt = a, and the current circumstances
θt. The next lemma characterizes some properties of the court’s tolerance threshold, and, thus, P ’s
authority claim each period.
Lemma 3. The court’s tolerance threshold a(θt, a) satisfies:






(ii) for all θt < θ̂(a), a(θt, a) is strictly increasing with θt;
(iii) for all θt, the distance between a(θt, a) and a is decreasing with a.
The first point is simply the contra-positive of Lemma 1. Each period, there exist states under
which the court tolerates full authority acquisition due to the inefficiency loss induced by constrain-
ing P , ever more, to the prior authority level. Rather intuitively, the second point indicates that the
politician’s ability to claim more authority is increasing in the favorability of state circumstances.
The third point highlights that past authority acquisition can reduce the gains in authority
acquisition.6 To understand this result, let us return to the court’s trade-off between present
loss when upholding an expansive authority claim and the cost from losing future flexibility when
overturning. When the politician has already acquired a relatively large scope of authority, the
court’s concern about her future flexibility is relatively low since P already can do a great deal
with her current authority. Hence, a large stock of existing authority makes the court less lenient
regarding contemporary claims for even more. The difference between what the politician already
has and what the court will tolerate (and hence, under this equilibrium, what the politician will
claim) reliably decreases as the politician secures ever more authority.
6This last point also explains why claiming authority up to the court’s tolerance threshold each period t is not
necessarily an equilibrium for all discount factors β. The politician needs to sufficiently discount the possible lower
authority claim in the future.
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In combination, points (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 3 have important substantive consequences for
the dynamics of authority acquisition: past authority acquisitions do not predict future ones. A
politician who starts period t with a lot of room for action (a large maxRt) may end up in period
t+ 1 with less authority than an office-holder who started with a smaller permissible set.




l < maxRht = a
h, there exists θ†(al, ah) < θ̂(al) such that for all θt ∈ (θ
†(al, ah), θ̂(ah)),
then maxRlt+1 > maxR
h
t+1.
This result again follows from the court becoming less tolerant of an executive’s ambitions when
she already has acquired substantial authority. The complement also is true. Indeed, precisely
because past restrictions on authority portend future advancements, a politician may experience a
“reversal of fortune,” allowing her to overcome the levels of authority she would have acquired had
the court previously adopted a more accommodating posture. Past restrictions, in this sense, have
the potential to hasten the onset of executive absolutism.
This, though, is certain: a politician’s authority today poorly predicts her authority tomorrow.
Even after restricting attention to a specific strategy, we can only know that the executive will
increase her scope of authority over time. We cannot say anything definitive about the pace of its
expansion, as smaller jumps may beget larger ones, and vice versa. When it comes to authority,
whoever understands the past has no special insight into the future.
To see how these dynamics function, consider Figure 1. Here, we track the authority acquired
by two executives over ten periods. The two executives, square and triangle, face a common
realization of θ in every period except the first. In period 1, the square executive benefits from
more favorable circumstances than the triangle executive and therefore is able to acquire more
authority. Notice, though, that this initial advantage is not permanent. In period 3, the common
realization of θ allows the triangle executive to acquire more authority than the square executive.
Additional reversals of fortune appear in periods 6 and 8. We also see how different realizations of
θ can produce relatively smaller or larger jumps in authority. And illustrating Proposition 1, both
executives acquire more authority in every period until each, illustrating Proposition 2, acquires
full authority.
We can also use the period-by-period maximally admissible equilibrium to study some compar-
ative statics on authority acquisition. We first consider how the variance of the state of the world



















Figure 1: Dynamics of authority acquisition
circumstances, the more attuned the court becomes to the costs of permanently constraining the
politician. The executive, for her part, takes advantage of this heightened demand for flexibility in
order to acquire greater authority each period for herself. We therefore obtain the following result:
Corollary 1. Take two CDFs of the state of the world θ, FA and FB, such that FB is a mean-
preserving spread of FA. Denote aA(θ, a) and aB(θ, a) the tolerance thresholds under distributions
FA and FB, respectively. For all a ∈ [0, 1) and all θ ∈ [0, θ̂(a)), aB(θ, a) ≥ aA(θ, a).
Our model, thus, indicates that we should observe a greater push for authority in environments
that are more volatile (among presidential systems, think of Latin American regimes) than in those
that are relatively stable (e.g., the United States).
Can we generate similarly clear comparative statics on players’ patience, as characterized by the
discount factor β? The answer is no. As the court becomes more patient, it puts more weight on the
need for flexibility. This tends to make the court more lenient, as we have just seen. But greater
patience also means that the court cares more about the cost of future extensions of executive
authority, which reduces the court’s incentive to permit further authority acquisition. Depending
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on circumstances (the state of the world, but also the stock of authority already acquired), one or
the other force can dominate, and the tolerance threshold can either increase or decrease with β.
Finally, we evaluate the effects of judicial appointments, albeit in a very reduced form. It is
well known that presidents tend to use their appointment powers to create a more accommodating
judiciary. What happens when the ideal point of the court is allowed to change? Quite obviously,
the more a judge is aligned with the executive (higher κC), the more authority the office-holder
can obtain each period.
A more interesting question, though, concerns how an incumbent judge alters his behavior in
anticipation of his subsequent replacement. To study this matter, suppose that a judge with ideal
point κC learns he is to be replaced next period by a judge with ideal point κN (where N stands
for new judge). Denote a(θ, a;κN) the judge’s tolerance threshold after he learns that he will be
permanently replaced in the next period. The following proposition shows that, compared to the
case when he is not replaced, the incumbent judge is more stringent if he is to be replaced by a
judge who is more favorable to the executive, and more lenient otherwise.
Corollary 2. If κN > κC, then a(θ, a;κN) ≤ a(θ, a), with strict inequality if and only if θ < θ̂(a).
If κN < κC, then a(θ, a;κN) ≥ a(θ, a) with strict inequality if and only if θ < θ̂(a).
This corollary identifies an inter-temporal tradeoff associated with judicial appointments. On
the one hand, packing the courts with constitutionally like-minded judges is beneficial for the
executive in the long run. In the short run, however, it comes at some cost. Incumbent judges, after
all, become less favorable to the office-holder as they anticipate greater expansion of authority in
the future. Should the politician appoint judges with a more restrictive view of executive authority,
however, she can expect the incumbent judge to assume a more accommodating posture. Once the
less favorable replacement judge takes office, however, the executive will claim less authority than
she otherwise would if the incumbent judge had remained on the bench.
4 Extensions
Thus far, we have studied a setting in which a single politician faces a court whose only recourse
when faced with an objectionable authority claim is to lock down the status quo ever more. In this
section, we relax both of these assumptions. First, we consider the role of electoral competition in
constraining the growth of the executive. And second, we moderate the effects of an objectionable
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court ruling. Both of these changes can alter the politician’s authority claims in any given period.
Neither, though, guarantees a halt in the march toward executive absolutism.
4.1 Political turnover and executive authority
In this extension, we allow for the possibility that the incumbent executive loses office. As such,
the authority acquired today by the incumbent may be used against her tomorrow by an opposing
successor. More specifically, we assume that at the beginning of each period, before θt is realized,
Nature determines the identity of the officeholder, which can be either Pl or Pr. Once a politician is
in power in period t, there is a probability π that she remains in office next period. This probability
captures in reduced form an office-holder’s incumbency advantage (if π ≥ 1/2) or disadvantage (if
π < 1/2).
When politician J ∈ {Pl, Pr} holds authority, her utility from having deployed authority yt
remains v(yt), as in the baseline model. When her opponent −J is in office, however, J ’s utility
from authority yt being used is −v(yt). That is, for J ∈ {Pl, Pr},
UJ(yt) =
v(yt) if J is in office−v(yt) otherwise
The rest of the model remains unchanged. In particular, we assume that the court cares only about
constitutional considerations and the state of the world.
With or without political turnover, the court’s problem remains the same as in the baseline
model. The court cannot impose a hard constraint on the executive since it always wants to give
itself some flexibility to deal with exceptional future circumstances. Hence, any constraint on
authority can only come from changes in equilibrium behavior induced by (expected) fluctuations
in personnel. Our next result establishes that as long as the incumbency disadvantage is not too
high (that is, π is not too low), then the unique outcome of the game is executive absolutism, much
like Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. There exists π < 1/2 such that if the probability the incumbent remains in power
satisfies π > π, then any equilibrium satisfies lim
t→∞
Rt = [0, 1] with probability 1.
Our revised framework predicts that electoral competition may generate restraints on authority
acquisition, but only if there is a strong enough incumbency disadvantage. Only then, after all, is
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the incumbent sufficiently afraid to leave her opponent unchecked in next period and, thus, acts so
that legal bounds are placed on authority. In the U.S. setting where the incumbency advantage is
well documented (see, e.g., Fowler 2016), the likelihood of electoral competition curtailing authority
acquisition hovers right around zero.
4.2 Alternative judicial rule
A reader may be concerned that the court’s unwillingness to constrain the executive is an artifact
of the stringent rejection rule in the baseline model. Concerns about future executive flexibility,
after all, induce the court to authorize claims of new authority each period. And in the baseline
model, a court rejection shuts this down, once and for all. This section demonstrates that the
reader’s concern is unwarranted. When we introduce a rejection rule that allows for future claims
of executive authority, the court nonetheless behaves much as it does in the baseline model.
Recall that in the baseline model, when the court overturns an authority claim, the discretion
set collapses (Rt ∪ Wt = [0, 1]), and future authority extension becomes impossible. Suppose,
instead, that if the court overturns an authority claim a′ > maxRt, then the impermissible set
only extends up to the claim recently struck down: Wt = (a
′, 1].7 We still assume the authority
deployed this period is the maximum of the permissible set (i.e., yt(dt) = at if the court upholds
the claim at, and maxRt if the court overturns it).
This seemingly benign assumption change generates a string of complexities when analyzing
the relationship between the executive and the court. In the baseline model, the stringent rejection
rule allows us to straightforwardly compute the court’s and executive’s payoffs in the aftermath of
a rejection. We can then compare the expected payoff from overturning the authority claim with
the expected payoff from permitting it, which allows us to determine both the limit outcomes of
all equilibria and the behavior in the period-by-period maximally admissible equilibrium. In this
extension, we are no longer able to do so. Here, once the court overturns a possible authority claim
a′, a “new” game starts between the judiciary and the executive, where authority is bounded to a′
rather than 1. The payoffs from overturning an authority claim, therefore, are undetermined, as
they depend on the strategies subsequently played by both actors. Absent a well-defined outside
option, it becomes harder to determine the behaviors of the judiciary and the executive. Despite
these difficulties, however, we find several similarities between this set-up and our baseline model.
7We assume that a′ /∈ Wt so that the executive’s problem remains well-behaved.
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Our next result shows that the behavior of the court under the more permissive rejection rule
resembles its choice under the more stringent one. In every period, for every precedent, the court is
willing to accept a full authority claim whenever circumstances require it (for a high enough value
of θ). Further, in all states of the world, there exist some new authority claim that the judiciary
upholds. As such, Proposition 5 indicates that, once more, the judiciary remains a weak constraint
on the executive.
Proposition 5. Suppose maxRt = a ∈ [0, 1) and minWt = a
R ∈ (a, 1]. Then in any equilibrium:
(i) There exists a unique θ̂L (a, aR) such that for all θt ≥ θ̂
L (a, aR), the court upholds any authority
claim in the discretion set: for all a′ ∈ [a, aR], d(θt, a
′, a, aR) = 0.
(ii) For all θt, there exists a(θ, a, a
R) ∈ (a, aR] such that the court upholds the executive’s authority
claim at, that is d(θt, at, a, a
R) = 0, if at ∈ [a, a(θ, a, a
R)].
The change in the rejection rules (from stringent in the baseline model to permissive in this
extension) does not substantially alter the judiciary’s behavior. First, there exist circumstances
under which the court allows a claim of full authority even though it induces a cost in the future.
Note that this implies that the gain from greater flexibility upon overturning is limited. Indeed, if
the court overturns at = 1, this does not change future interactions since the executive’s authority
can never exceed 1. Yet, the expectations of future encroachment make this greater flexibility of
limited interest to the court, who is willing to accept a full authority claim when circumstances are
dire (i.e., when θt is sufficiently high).
A consequence of the Proposition’s first result is that the court does not want to constrain
the executive so much that any adaptation becomes impossible. As we have already discussed,
the executive can then, if she wishes, exploit the judiciary’s demand for flexibility to claim and
obtain still more authority. In short, the court in every situation is willing to let authority grow,
sometimes by a little, sometimes by a lot.
Does the judiciary’s behavior lead to executive absolutism, as in the baseline model? In this
setting, that is, can we prove an equivalent to Proposition 2? We cannot, at least not definitively.
We cannot rule out the possibility that an executive will constrain herself—that is, she will choose
some authority claim that is overturned—in the hopes of converging faster to a new, albeit lower,
limit. Even if such equilibria exist, however, they are likely to be fragile. As long as the executive
is sufficiently impatient or sufficiently patient, after all, we can be sure that she will eventually
acquire full authority, again as in the baseline model. Indeed, when the office-holder’s discount
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factor is low, she cares less about the future and therefore always chooses to maximize her per-
period authority. Consequently, the executive always chooses an authority extension as high as the
tolerance threshold permits, and no claim is ever overturned in equilibrium. In the limit, then, full
authority is granted to the office-holder, almost despite herself. In turn, if the executive is very
patient, she puts significant weight on the maximum authority she can claim in the limit. Since
anything below full authority provides a lower payoff than total control over the domain in the
long run, the politician prefers to be prudent in the short run in order to eventually realize these
long-term gains.
5 Discussion
This section addresses three broad considerations, followed by a more specific conceptual elabora-
tion of our treatment of precedent. The three broad considerations are: first, the verisimilitude
of our model and judicial reasoning; second, different understandings of authority acquisition; and
finally, the ultimate need for executive moderation in a system of separated powers that intends to
guard against executive absolutism.
Verisimilitude. In our model, the politician extends the reach of her authority well past
what the court would constitutionally prefer by exploiting the court’s concern about changes in the
material world. The introduction of θ, however, is not just a technical conceit. Rather, it figures
prominently in the judicial record on executive power.
When deciding how to rule on a case, judges consult more than their jurisprudential values and
understandings. They also monitor basic facts about the state of the world. A substantial body
of scholarship documents the allowances that judges routinely extend to presidents during times of
national calamity. Nearly 75 years ago, Edward Corwin (1947, 80) put the point this way:
War does not of itself render constitutional limitations liable to outright suspension by
either Congress or President, but does frequently make them considerably less stiff—the
war emergency infiltrates them and renders them pliable. Earlier constitutional abso-
lutism is replaced by constitutional relativity: it all depends ...[on] what the Supreme
Court finds to be reasonable in the circumstances.
In search of rules and principles that establish what is “reasonable in the circumstances,” a
voluminous body of legal scholarship on “crisis jurisprudence” has elaborated on Corwin’s obser-
vation that the judiciary adapts and reinterprets constitutional provisions in light of contemporary
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exigencies (see, for example, Cole 2003; Tushnet 2003; Gross and Ni Aolain 2006). More recently
still, empirical research has demonstrated that the federal judiciary routinely approves presidential
actions during times of war that, during peace, it would invariably strike down (Epstein et al 2005;
Howell and Ahmed 2014; Clark 2006).8
Concerns about future flexibility, which propel many of the core findings in our model, also
inform judicial decision-making. In addition to present shocks, judges regularly worry about the
implications of their rulings for executive efforts to attend to future circumstances. Hence, during
periods of peace, judges anticipate the possibility of war’s return;9 and so doing, they may issue
rulings that look very different from those that would emerge in a world that had rid itself of human
conflict, once and for all. Similarly, in the throes of war, judges reflect upon the implications of
their rulings for peace-time governance;10 and consequently, they may appear less understanding of
executive authority claims than they would if they were convinced that a present war would persist
ad infinitum. In these ways, past empirical research that compares war-time and peace-time rulings
may understate the true relevance of war for judicial decisions.
Our characterization of judicial precedence also broadly conforms with American jurisprudence
on executive authority. In every version of our model, authority, once conferred, can never be
subsequently retracted. Likewise, American courts have appeared reticent to overturn past rulings
that involve the president. Of course, precedence is not full proof, and the courts do occasionally
revisit their previous decisions. (Think, most obviously, of Brown v. Board and Plessy v. Ferguson).
Hardly ever, though, does this happen on matters that concern executive authority. The courts
assuredly have overturned executive claims, sometimes quite famously (Youngstown v. Sawyer or
U.S. v. Nixon). But quite consistent with our characterization of precedence, American courts
generally never reconsider past rulings and disallow that which they previously authorized. We
elaborate further on the treatment of precedent momentarily.
Authority. Our model treats authority acquisition in terms of general involvement in and
influence over a specified policy domain (which we represent as the [0,1] interval). In a world of
multiple policy domains, our model may be understood as treating each such domain independently.
Thus, the acquisition of presidential authority over immigration policy is treated as separate from
8When reflecting upon changing “circumstances,” of course, judges pay attention to more than just war. Brennan,
Epstein, and Staudt (2009), for instance, document the relevance of a variety of macroeconomic factors for judicial
decision-making. During major economic downturns, they show, judges are especially likely to uphold actions taken
by the adjoining branches of government.
9See, for example, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
10For a particularly thoughtful treatment of the subject, see Justice Robert Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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the acquisition of authority in some other domain, say civil rights enforcement. And the courts
may look differently at different domains; that is, its jurisprudential ideal, represented in the model
by κC , would be subscripted by policy domain. Nevertheless, Proposition 2 applies to each policy
domain individually; and in the limit, the executive acquires full authority in each domain.11
An alternative reading of authority acquisition consistent with our model focuses not on a
specific policy domain, but rather on a specific type of action that would apply across policy
domains. On this interpretation, the executive acquires authority, say, to re-program appropriated
funds across accounts, to pardon individuals, to exercise unilateral action through executive orders,
to reorganize agencies and bureaucracies, to hire and fire agency personnel off her own bat. The
court rules, in these instances, on the general ability of the executive to act authoritatively in
specific ways. And, once again, Proposition 2 applies.
Moderation. Our model reveals the inadequacies of judicial restraints on executive ambition.
Court impediments notwithstanding, the politician in our model ultimately acquires all the au-
thority she wishes. To ensure that this acquisition does not deplete all available authority, one of
two conditions must hold: in the baseline model, the politician must want something less than full
authority; or in the expanded model with electoral competition, at least one of the politicians must
want less than full authority and act in ways that provoke a judicial rejection, which henceforth
constrains the future authority claims of both politicians.
Executive absolutism, as such, may be avoided, but only if politicians exercise what Steven
Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2018) call “forbearance.” On their own accord, politicians must
exercise individual self-restraint and moderate their claims to authority. This proviso, however,
offers little reassurance in American politics. Since Richard Neustadt’s seminal work (1960), nearly
every major presidential scholar has recognized the extraordinary expectations that the public
places upon presidents. This basic fact, more than any other, leads presidents to seek authority
at every turn. Indeed, those presidents who reveal a modest appetite for power (think James
Buchanan, William Howard Taft, or Herbert Hoover) are routinely excoriated for their failed tenures
in office. To be president, at its very core, is to want, seek, nurture, and preserve power (Howell
2013).
Notice, moreover, that the need for individual moderation runs counter to the very premise of
the founders’ constitutional project. The founders certainly lauded modesty, virtue, and the like,
11A more sophisticated treatment would allow for a court decision in one domain to have spillovers into other
domains. Decisions in one domain, that, is, would affect court utility in other domains and, by backward induction,
would induce a more nuanced, cross-domain, strategic anticipation by the executive in the first instance.
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but they did not count upon them to protect their fledgling democratic experiment—“if men were
angels” and all that. To their core, the founders were realists. They took as given the nature
of men (and to be clear, politically, they only had men in mind); and in men they recognized
extraordinary appetites for power. It is for precisely this reason that the founders put their faith in
external checks on presidential power; that they looked to an independently elected Congress and a
judiciary filled with life-time appointees to frustrate and delimit the president’s claims of authority.
What the founders did not appreciate, and what our model reveals, is that these checks could
only forestall executive absolutism. They could not permanently impede it. For that, executive
forbearance would be needed after all.
Precedent. The court, in our model, adheres strictly to precedent. Once an executive claim
of authority is granted, it is never reversed; and once a claim is rejected, it is never reconsidered.
In either scenario, there is no going back.
To appreciate the importance that precedent plays in our model, it is worth noting that our
result on executive absolutism would continue to hold even if the court, and not an independent
executive, determined the reach of authority acquisition in each period. In some circumstances, the
court would grant full authority to the office-holder; and in expectation of this possibility, it would
never want to impose restrictions on executive authority. As in our baseline model, the court’s
concern for flexibility propels the growth of executive authority. A key difference, however, is that
the court would suspend authority expansion whenever present circumstances were sufficiently
unfavorable to the executive (i.e., for sufficiently low θ).12 In this way, the politician’s ability to
make authority claims for herself hastens the onset of executive absolutism (Proposition 1), but it
does not cause it.
As an empirical matter, however, there exist important exceptions to the doctrine of judicial
precedent. The courts, after all, do in fact reverse themselves, and do in fact reconsider previ-
ous precedents. Consequently, at least three interrelated concerns with our assumption of strict
adherence to precedent warrant some consideration.
There is, first of all, the slipperiness of the concept itself. Any lawyer worth her salt will argue
that an adverse prior precedent-setting ruling does not apply to the case at hand. This raises
what might be called “the dimensionality problem”—namely, that authority is multidimensional,
a particular precedent may apply to some dimensions but not to others, and, in particular, that it
12All these results are proven formally in Lemma B.1 in the Online Appendix for a lenient rejection rule, but they
also hold for the stringent rule of the baseline model.
does not apply to the particular case under consideration. This manoeuver granulates precedent
and, in the extreme, renders it altogether irrelevant. For understood this way, precedent is binding
only on cases that match the precedent-setting case in all its particulars.
Closely related, and a more general way of putting the preceding concern, is the matter of
“state-contingent rulings,” which dictate that precedent applies only when external circumstances
warrant, so that decisions in a state of war do not constrain during peace-time, that decisions
taken during economic emergencies do not apply when the emergency has lifted, and so on.13
While we take an extreme view that precedents are always binding, the view that precedents are
state-contingent (in the terms of our model, θ) constitutes the other extreme. In this latter view,
after all, past precedents effectively play no role, as they apply to a set of measure-zero events,
and, consequently, there is no accumulation of judicial doctrine.
An intermediate view applies precedent to a category of states. This allows the court to employ
a state-contingent precedent to any authority claim made during states falling within a particular
range of θ’s. Solving such a set up would entail many modifications of our model and thus is beyond
the scope of this paper. We conjecture, however, that the limiting case for each category of states
will have the executive acquiring as much authority as possible (though the possibility frontier may
be less than full authority).14
13A famous example of this is the dictator institution practiced by the Roman Republic for several centuries. This
institution was common during periods of crisis—famines, epidemics, internal insurrections, external attacks. On
such occasions, the Senate appointed an individual—the dictator—who was given a brief period (usually six months)
in which to exercise extraordinary authority, including the suspension of civil liberties and other constitutionally
guaranteed rights, in order to restore normal order. After this period, in a manner practiced by Cincinnatus,
the extraordinary authority was relinquished. In terms of our model, the dictator institution is a state-contingent
extension of authority that is withdrawn when the designated states of the world no longer obtain. Yet, history
teaches us that even these provisions were not enough. After all, the institution of dictator was abused by Sulla in
80 BCE and ultimately brought to an end in 45 BCE when Julius Caesar forced the Senate to name him “dictator
for life,” which effectively ended the Republic, precipitated civil war, and led eventually to the rise of an imperial
regime.
14This conjecture builds on observations drawn from simple modifications of our set-up. Suppose that θ < 1
1−β
(but θ > 1−2κ
C
2(1−β) ). Under these parameter values, when the executive’s stock of existing authority is low (maxRt = a
is relatively small) and when the situation is dire (θt is sufficiently high), the court is willing to uphold a full
authority claim (at = 1) over the domain (dt(θt, 1, a, 1) = 0). As long as this stock remains low, meanwhile, the
court’s interest in flexibility also leads it to accede to less-than-full authority claims for lower realizations of θt. But
once the executive has accumulated a large amount of authority (maxRt = a is relatively large), the court becomes
less concerned about additional flexibility and therefore it overturns full authority claims in all states. Under these
circumstances, it is not obvious that the executive will be able to claim any additional authority for any realizations
of θt. More formally, there exists â ∈ (0, 1] such that: (i) the court upholds at = 1 in some states if maxRt = a < â;
(ii) the politician can claim more authority every period as long as a < â (Proposition 2 holds for a < â); and
(iii), as a result, the lower bound of executive’s authority in the limit is at least â ( lim
t→∞
maxRt ≥ â). We cannot
precisely characterize the limit of executive authority since the executive has strong incentives to strategically wait
for particularly favorable circumstances when her stock of existing authority is relatively low, which allows her to
claim authority levels that exceed â. This much, however, is certain: even for these smaller values of θ, we cannot
rule out the possibility of executive absolutism.
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Third is the matter of reversals. A court may determine that authority previously falling in
the permissible set is no longer permissible, or it may determine that authority previously rejected
is now to be allowed. In either case, reversals are most likely to occur when the composition of
the court (and hence its jurisprudential ideal, κC) changes. Such changes are unmodeled in our
approach, as are the reputational costs that presumably accompany rejections of past precedent.
Introducing them, though, assuredly would qualify the role of precedent as we have modeled it,
and would possibly affect the dynamics of authority acquisition.15
All of these observations suggest that a richer elaboration of precedent may yield results that
differ from the conclusions we draw. Indeed, they raise deep issues about why courts so strenuously
rely on a relatively strict adherence to precedent in the first place (Clark 2016, Fox and Vanberg
2014, Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson 2002.). By adopting an uncompromising view of prece-
dent, however, the model on offer clarifies its implications for judicial behavior when conjoined with
an equally uncompromising need for flexibility. Insisting upon both, we show, the court eventually
relinquishes to the executive every bit of authority to be had. If not as a matter of empirical
prediction, then certainly as a matter of institutional design, this is a fact worth knowing.
6 Conclusion
Our model pits the authority aspirations of an executive politician against the restraints of judicial
review. Both players in the model, the politician and the court, have preferences over authority.
The politician’s is unbounded, the better to prosecute her policy agenda, to feel efficacious, to leave
a legacy, or to accomplish whatever else may motivate her; all these objectives are monotonic in
authority. The court, by contrast, is motivated by jurisprudential considerations, today and into
the future. These constitutional principles, however, are adjusted each period to reflect the period-
specific nature of the times. The court, therefore, seeks to balance what seems optimal today
in terms of its principles, its concerns about the present situation, and its assessment of future
contextual circumstances. And this is the opening exploited strategically by the politician. The
15Much of the effect of reversal depends on the assumptions one makes. If the court can reverse past decisions
after the executive has acquired full authority, then, by assumption, executive absolutism becomes impossible. But
if full authority over a domain becomes permanent after it is granted, and if the court continues to value flexibility
(e.g., it can only modify the permissible and impermissible sets from time to time or at great cost), then the forces
at play in our model would continue to inform the judiciary’s behavior and we should expect executive absolutism
to arise again.
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court’s need to balance present payoffs against the need for flexibility in light of future possibilities
enables the politician to push the authority envelope until all that is available is eventually acquired.
Notice that this finding is recovered from an austere and rather idealized setting. Plenty of
scholars have recognized numerous institutional weaknesses associated with the judiciary: lack of
enforcement powers, informational asymmetries, political vulnerabilities, and so forth (Bickel 1955;
Rosenberg 1992). The court in our model does not suffer any of these liabilities; and yet, still, it
cannot put a stop to the politician’s claims for more authority.
This does not mean that the court has no effect. As Lemma 1 reports, it is always possible
for the politician to “go too far,” and to be punished for her transgression. But “going too far”
is determined endogenously in our model—the result of the court balancing today’s payoff against
future concerns for flexibility—and, as Proposition 1 reports, this provides the politician with the
opportunity, if prudent, to expand her authority. Together, these results imply that complete
and total acquisition of authority by the executive is inevitable for all possible equilibrium paths
(Proposition 2).
Two extensions suggest that this (rather alarming) conclusion is robust. First, we examine
electoral competition. Perhaps, one might conjecture, the prospect of competition between political
opponents with opposed policy objectives will deter an incumbent executive from maxing out on
authority acquisition for fear of handing off enhanced authority to an opponent who will make policy
mischief. Proposition 4, however, stipulates that such behavior occurs only if today’s office-holder
is highly likely to lose office tomorrow; that is, only if the incumbency disadvantage is sufficiently
large. Hence, in many situations (especially the United States today), Proposition 2 applies and
electoral competition is not a bulwark against the extension of executive authority.
A second extension proposes a seemingly less potent judicial role. In the baseline model, if the
court overturns an authority claim, then the previously authorized level is imposed in perpetuity.
As Proposition 2 tells us, though, the court’s club behind the door has the counter-intuitive effect
of being no constraint at all—at least not in the limit. Suppose instead, then, that a court rejection
conveys only a present limitation on unacceptable authority, and does not shut off the prospect of
further increases in authority altogether; an overruling, that is, reduces the court’s discretion set
but does not eliminate it. Proposition 5 establishes that this judicial rule essentially reproduces
the result under the more draconian rule. To be sure, on-the-equilibrium-path developments will
differ between the two rules. But in either case, limiting outcomes look a good deal like executive
absolutism. The baseline judicial rule will produce full executive authority, while the modified
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judicial rule will fall short of that only if the executive, herself, opts to adopt a strategy that yields
something less.
There are additional avenues of generalization that we have not explored. Future work may
wish to allow the court to revisit previously rejected authority claims or treat the court as a draw
each period from a distribution of possible courts. Herein, though, we have established at least a
prime facie case for suspending the almost religious faith that separation of powers, all by itself,
guards against executive absolutism.
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A Proofs for the baseline model
From the reasoning in the text, recall that:
(a) Given our assumption on the construction of precedent (R0 = {0} and Rt+1 = [0, at] if
at /∈ Rt ∪Wt and dt = 0), in any equilibrium Rt is an interval from 0 to some upper bound.
(b) In the proofs, we focus on the case when for all t′ < t, then dt′ = 0 (otherwise, Rt ∪Wt = [0, 1]
under the assumption).
(c) Given the office-holder’s utility function and the constraint precedents impose on the court,
in any equilibrium, for all periods t, the politician’s authority choice satisfies at ≥ maxRt. For
all at ≤ maxRt, the executive’s authority claim is not overturned. Since the politician’s utility is
increasing in yt and yt = at for all at ∈ Rt, at = maxRt strictly dominates any choice of authority
strictly smaller than maxRt.
Using (a)-(c), we can thus define Rt := [0, at−1], with a0 = 0.
(d) Finally, the politician never selects any authority above 1 in the baseline model so we can
(without loss of generality) assume that the minimum of the impermissible set Wt is 1.
Proof of Lemma 1
Denote the court’s continuation value in period t (i.e., her expected utility present and future at
the beginning of period t) as a function of past sanctioned authority claim maxRt = a and past
overturned claim minWt = a
′: V (a, a′). Note that under the assumption and our slight change of
notation a′ ∈ {a, 1}. Note further that we do not include time subscript in the continuation value
since we consider a Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
When an authority claim has been overturned in a previous period so minWt = a ∈ [0, 1], the
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court’s continuation value is simply:
V (a, a) = −
Eθ
(




Observe that since we consider Markov Perfect Equilibrium, all relevant information for players’
actions is contained in the state variables (the bounds of the permissible and impermissible sets).
Hence, we can drop the time indices from the continuation values. Further, because in this lemma
we assume equilibrium existence, these continuation values can be assumed to exist.
Absent previous overturning, given maxRt = a ∈ [0, 1] and faced with an authority claim at /∈






+ βV (at, 1) ≥ −
(
a− κC − θt
)2
+ βV (a, a) (A.2)
If the executive proposes at = 1, the court knows that if it upholds, R will exert full authority in the
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Proof of Proposition 1
Recall from the main text that we define R’s strategy as at(θt, a, 1) (with θt the state in period
t and a = maxRt, and 1 = minWt under the assumption and slight abuse of notation). Using
the notation introduced in the proof of the previous lemma, observe then that in any equilib-















. By Lemma 1, for all θt ≥ θ̂(at), the court prefers
full authority claim to the status quo at and at+1(θt, at, 1) = 1 since full authority forever is the





















= V (at, at) for any at ∈ [0, 1). Fur-
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We now prove that there exists γ(θ, a) > 0 such that for all γ ∈ (0, γ(θ, a)), −(a+ γ − κC − θ)2 +
βV (a+γ, 1) ≥ −(a−κC−θ)2+βV (a, a). This is equivalent to showing that the following inequality
holds −2γ
(
a + γ/2 − κC − θ) + β
[
V (a + γ, 1) − V (a, a)
]
≥ 0. To do so, we first prove that there
exists a γ and a ξ > 0 such that V (a+ γ, 1)− V (a, a) ≥ ξ for all γ ∈ [0, γ).
Suppose that V (a, 1) is continuous in a neighborhood of a. Then using V (a, 1) > V (a, a), there
exists γ > 0 such that for all γ ∈ [0, γ), V (a + γ, 1) > V (a, a) (with γ either the upper bound of
say neighborhood or the smallest solution to V (a+ γ, 1) = V (a, a) in say neighborhood).
We now assume that V (a, 1) exhibits a discontinuity at some a ∈ [0, 1). For simplicity, we
assume that there exists γ ∈ (0, 1 − a] such that for all γ ∈ (0, γ), V (a + γ, 1) ≤ V (a, a)
(the proof can be extended to take care of the case when there exists ǫ → 0 such that for all
γ ∈ (0, γ) \ {ǫ}, V (a+ γ, 1) > V (a, a) and V (a+ ǫ, 1) ≤ V (a, a)).16 Recall from the end of the first









there exists γ̂ ∈ (0, γ) (a well-defined interval since γ > 0) such that there exist φ > 0 and ψ > 0







dF (θ) ≥ ψ (by Lemma 1, recall that θ̂(a) < θ for all a ∈ [0, 1]). Hence,
there exists χ > 0 (e.g., χ = φψ) such that for all γ ∈ (0, γ̂), V (a + γ, 1) − V (a + γ, a + γ) ≥ χ.
Under the assumption that V (a + γ, 1) ≤ V (a, a) for all γ ∈ (0, γ̂) ⊂ (0, γ), we then obtain that
for all γ ∈ (0, γ̂), |V (a+ γ, a+ γ)− V (a, a)| ≥ χ. This means that for all η ∈ (0, χ) (a well defined
interval given χ > 0), |V (a + γ, a + γ) − V (a, a)| > η for all γ ∈ (0, γ̂) violating the finding that
V (a′, a′) is continuous in a′. Hence, even if V (a, 1) exhibits a discontinuity at a, it must be that
there exists γ > 0 such that for all γ ∈ (0, γ), V (a+ γ, 1) > V (a, a).
In turn, −2γ
(
a+ γ/2− κC − θ) is continuous in γ and goes to 0 as γ → 0. Given that there exists
γ > 0 such that β(V (a + γ, 1) − V (a, a)) is bounded below away from zero for all γ ∈ (0, γ) (by
16Obviously, if the discontinuity is such that for all γ ∈ (0, γ), V (a + γ, 1) > V (a, a), the claim holds. Note,
further, that, in practice, γ and all the bounds below depend on a, we omit this dependence in the notation for ease
of exposition.
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the reasoning above), for all θ and all a = maxRt ∈ [0, 1), there exists γ(θ, a) > 0 such that the
court upholds any new authority claim satisfying at ∈ [a, a+ γ(a, θ)]. Denote a(θ, a) = a+ γ(θt, a)
to complete the proof of the Lemma.
Lemma A.1. In any equilibrium, the executive never makes an authority claim which is overturned:
The executive’s strategy at(θ, a, 1) satisfies dt(θ, at(θ, a, 1), a, 1) = 0 in every period t and for all
θ, a.
Proof. Suppose there exists a θ and a such that in equilibrium the executive picks at(θ, a, 1) and is
overturned. R’s continuation value is then v(a)
1−β
. We now show that there is a profitable deviation
upon reaching the state θ with permissible set a (keeping the executive’s strategy unchanged in
any other state or for any other authorized claims). Suppose that instead the executive picks
aˆt(θ, a, 1) = a and then follows her prescribed strategy in all other states and sets of precedent.
Since for all permissible sets [0, a′] ⊂ [0, 1], there exists θ̂(a′) < θ such that at(θ, a
′, 1) = 1 for all
θ ∈ [θ̂(a′), θ], it must be that the deviation yields a continuation value strictly greater than v(a)
1−β
.
Hence, we have constructed a profitable deviation.
Proof of Proposition 2
Using Lemma A.1, we know that the court never overturns the politician’s authority claim on the
equilibrium path. From the proof of Lemma 1, we know that for all sets of precedents satisfying
maxR = a < 1, there exists a positive probability (i.e., F (θ̂(a))) that circumstances are such that
the office-holder makes a full authority claim (at(θt,Rt,Wt) = 1) and the court upholds. Joining
both facts together yield the proposition.
Before proving Lemma 2, the next technical lemmas prove the existence and uniqueness of contin-
uation values for the court and the executive when P in each period either claims full authority
if possible or makes the court indifferent between upholding and overturning the claim. We first
prove by construction that the court’s continuation value exists and is unique.
Lemma A.2. Suppose that in all periods t′ ≥ t, the court anticipates that R’s strategy satisfies
if maxRt′ = a ∈ [0, 1), at′(θt′ , a, 1) = 1 if θt′ ≥ θ̂(a) and at′(θt′ , a, 1) leaves the court’s indifferent
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between upholding and overturning at′(·) otherwise. In period t, the court’s continuation value exists
and is unique.
Proof. Denote the court’s continuation value V (·) and assume it exists. Under the specified strategy,
in all period t such that maxRt = a ∈ [0, 1) and θt < θ̂(a), at(θt, a, 1) satisfies:
−(at(θ, a, 1)− κ
C − θ)2 + βV (at(θ, a, 1), 1) = −(a− κ




C − θ)2) (A.3)
We can then rewrite V (a, 1) as
V (a, 1) =
∫ θ̂(a)
−θ
−(at(θ, a, 1)− κ












−(a− κC − θ)2 + β






−(1− κC − θ)2 + β
E(−(1− κC − θ)2)
1− β










2(a− κC)θdF (θ) +
∫ θ
θ̂(a)















−(a− κC)2 − V ar(θ) + (1− a)
∫ θ
θ̂(a)
2((1− β)θ + κC)− (a+ 1)dF (θ)
)
(A.4)
Equation A.4 directly shows (i) the continuation value exists, (ii) it is unique, and (iii) it is con-
tinuous and differentiable in a.
Having established the existence and uniqueness of the court’s continuation value given P ’s strategy,
we now show that in each period, the court uses a threshold rule to decide whether to uphold or
overturn (anticipating P ’s future actions).
Lemma A.3. Suppose that in all periods t′ > t, the court anticipates that P ’s strategy satisfies
if maxRt′ = a ∈ [0, 1), at′(θt′ , a, 1) = 1 if θt′ ≥ θ̂(a) and at′(θt′ , a, 1) leaves the court’s indifferent
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between upholding and overturning at′(·) otherwise. Then in period t, for all maxRt = a ∈ [0, 1)
and all tt < θ̂(a), there exists a unique a(θt, a) ∈ (a, 1) such that the court upholds authority claim
at if and only if at ≤ a(θt, a).
Proof. Using Equation A.4, the court upholds in period t a claim at if and only if
−(a− κC − θ)2 − β
(a− κC)2
1− β
≤ −(at − κ










2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dF (θ)
(A.5)
To show existence and uniqueness, rearrange the inequality in (A.5) as:
1
1− β
(at − a)(at + a− 2(κ






2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dF (θ)





2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dF (θ) ≥ 0 (A.6)
For all, at ≤ a, the court is constrained to uphold. We thus focus on the interval [a, 1]. Denote
H(at; θ, a) = 2(κ





2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dF (θ) (A.7)
That is, H(·) is the left-hand side of the inequality in (A.6). Observe that H(·) is strictly decreasing
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2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dF (θ) < 0
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since 2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1) > 0 for all θ > θ̂(at).
Further, by definition of θ̂(a), H(1; θ, a) < 0. In addition, lim
at→a
H(at; θ, a) = ∞. Hence there
exists a unique at(θ, a) ∈ (a, 1) such that the court upholds at if and only if at ≤ at(θ, a).
Having established the continuation value and the strategy of the court, we can now turn to the
continuation value of the office-holder.17
Lemma A.4. Suppose that in all periods t′ ≥ t, the court anticipates that R’s strategy satisfies
if maxRt′ = a ∈ [0, 1), at′(θt′ , a, 1) = 1 if θt′ ≥ θ̂(a) and at′(θt′ , a, 1) leaves the court’s indifferent
between upholding and overturning at′(·) otherwise, in period t, R’s continuation value exists and
is unique. Further, the continuation value is differentiable and its derivative with respect to a is
bounded.
Proof. Denote W (θ, a, 1) R’s payoff as a function of the circumstances θt and precedents a =
maxRt and (again slightly abusing notation) minWt = 1. Using Proposition 1, R only chooses
at ∈ [a, at(θt, a)], with, extending the notation introduced in Lemma A.3, at(θt, a) = 1 if θt ≥ θ̂(a)
or a = 1. We can then write:




W (θ, at, 1)
)
(A.8)
To show existence, uniqueness, and differentiability, we use the Blackwell’s theorem (Blackwell,
1965; Stokey and Lucas, 1989). A very clear proof, which serves as a model for the present paper,
can be found in Baker and Mezzetti (2012, Lemma 1).
Let S be the metric space of continuously differentiable, real-valued function ω : [−θ, θ]×[0, 1]→ R.
Let the metric on S be ρ(ω0, ω1) = sup
θ∈[−θ,θ],a∈[0,1]
|ω0(θ, a)−ω1(θ, a)|. Define the operator T mapping
the metric space S into itself as follows:







with ω(·, ·) an original guess for the continuation value and Tω(·) the updated guess.
17As it will become clear in the proof of Lemma A.4, we proceed slightly differently than for the court’s. For
the court’s continuation value, we look at the ex-ante period t continuation value (before the circumstances θt are
realized). For R, we look at the interim continuation value (after θt is drawn). This difference of approach is to
simplify the proof, but has no bearing on the main result.
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First, note that at(θt, a), implicitly defined as the solution to H(at; θt, a) = 0, with H(·) de-
fined in Equation A.7, is continuously differentiable. Indeed, by assumption F (·) is continuously
differentiable so all the terms in H(·) are continuously differentiable and so is the solution of the
equation H(at; θt, a) = 0.
We now show that W (·) defined in Equation A.8 exists and is unique by proving that T is a
contraction mapping. This requires to show that T satisfies monotonicity and discounting. Mono-
tonicity is easily verified: if ω1(θt, a) ≥ ω
0(θt, a) for all θt, a ∈ [−θ, θ] × [0, 1], then from Equa-
tion A.9 Tω1(θt, a) ≥ Tω
0(θt, a). For discounting, let z be a non negative constant map defined by
z(θt, a) = z for all θt, a ∈ [−θ, θ]×[0, 1]. Let the map (ω+z) be defined by (ω+z)(θt, a) = ω(θt, a)+z.
From Equation A.9, it can easily be checked that T (ω+ z)(θt, a) = Tω(θt, a)+βz. Since β ∈ (0, 1),
discounting holds as well. Thus, T is a contraction. Its unique fixed point is the continuously
differentiable real-valued function W (·) defined in Equation A.8.
We finally prove that the derivative of W (·) with respect to a is bounded. Consider the set S
the metric space of continuously differentiable, real-valued function ω : [−θ, θ]× [0, 1]→ R, whose
derivative with respect to their second argument is bounded. The set S is a subset of the set S so
to prove the result we need to show that T maps S onto itself. For this denote Kv a finite upper
bound on v′(·) (v′(y) ≤ Kv for all y). Consider a function ω(·) satisfying |ωa(θ, a)| < K
ω for some
Kω > 0 and for all θt, a ∈ [−θ, θ] × [0, 1] (with ωl the derivative with respect to the variable l).






assuming uniqueness (the proof is slightly more





0 if a∗t ∈ (a, at(θt, a))






v′(at(θt, a)) + βEt(ωa(θt, at(θt, a)))
)
if a∗t = at(θt, a)
Using Equation A.6, it can be checked that ∂at(θt,a)
∂a
is bounded (we prove this point formally below).
Hence, there exist KTω < ∞ such that
∣∣∣∂Tω(θt,a)∂a ∣∣∣ < KTω. Hence T maps function with bounded
derivative into function with bounded derivative so W (θ, a) satisfies Wa(θ, a) is bounded.
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Proof of Lemma 2
From Proposition 1, we know that if θt ≥ θ̂(a) for any maxRt = a < 1 or if a = 1, then at(θt, a) = 1
and the court upholds. In what follows, we exclusively focus on periods t satisfying maxRt = a < 1
and θt < θ̂(a).
From Lemma A.3, we know that if the court anticipates that R’s strategy satisfies for all t′ > t:
if maxRt′ = a
′ ∈ [0, 1), at′(θt′ , a
′, 1) = 1 if θt′ ≥ θ̂(a
′) and at′(θt′ , a
′, 1) = at′(θt′ , a
′), then in period
t, the court plays a threshold strategy in which she upholds if and only if at ≤ at(θt, a). We now
demonstrate that there exists β̂ such that if β ≤ β̂ in each period t, R makes a new authority claim
satisfying at(θt, a, 1) = a(θt, a).
Fix a, θt ∈ [0, 1) × [−θ, θ̂(a)). R prefers at = a(θt, a) to any other authority claim if and only if
v(a(θt, a)) + βEθ
(








. A sufficient condition is that




is weakly increasing in a′ for all a′ ∈ [a, a(θt, a)]. By
Lemma A.4, M(a′) is continuously differentiable so we can write ∂M(a
′)
∂a′






We know that Wa(θ, a) satisfies Wa(θ, a) ≥ −K
W for all θ, a ∈ [−θ, θ] × [0, 1] for some finite KW
(see Lemma A.4). Hence ∂M(a
′)
∂a′
≥ v′(a′) − βKW . If KW = 0 (i.e., Wa(θt, a) is always weakly




> 0 since KW is finite. For all β ≤ β̂,
M(a′) is strictly increasing in a′ for a′ ∈ [a, a(θt, a)] for all θt, a ∈ [−θ, θ̂(a)]× [0, 1) so at = a(θt, a)
is a best response to the court’s strategy.
Proof of Lemma 3
Point (i) follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1.
For the remaining points, we ignore arguments for ease of exposition, from Lemma A.3, recall that
a is the unique solution to H(a; θ, a) = 0 with
H(at; θ, a) = 2(κ





2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dF (θ),
strictly decreasing in at.





. Thus we can apply the Implicit Function
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Theorem. We obtain (using Hz to denote the partial derivative with respect to z):
Hat(a; θ, a)aθ + 2(1− β) = 0,
which immediately proves point (ii) since Hat(a; θ, a) < 0 from Lemma A.3.





Hat(a; θ, a) < 0,
∂(a−a)
∂a
has the same sign as Ha(a; θ, a) +Hat(a; θ, a).
Using Equation A.7, we obtain








(2((1− β)θ + κC)− a+ 1)dF (θ)
and (noting that 2((1− β)θ̂(at) + κ
C)− (at + 1) = 0 by definition of θ̂(at))












Hence, Ha(a; θ, a) + Hat(a; θ, a) < 0 and the distance between a(θ, a) and a decreases with a as
claimed.






, θ̂(al) < θ̂(ah). From Lemma 3, a(θ, a) is continuously strictly increasing
in θ for all θ < θ̂(a). Combining both properties together, there exists θ†(al, ah) satisfying the
property of the proposition. Note that θ†(al, ah) < θ̂(al) since at θt = θ̂(a
l), a(θ̂(al), al) = 1 and
a(θ̂(al), ah) < 1.
Proof of Corollary 1
Recall that at (ignoring arguments) is the solution to H(at; θ, a) = 0 with
H(at; θ, a) = 2(κ





2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dF (θ),
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and does not depend on the distribution of the states of the
world.







2((1−β)θ+κC)−(at+1)dFJ(θ), J ∈ {A,B}. To prove the result, it is sufficient




2((1− β)θ+ κC)− (at + 1)dFA(θ) ≤
∫ θ
θ̂(at)
2((1− β)θ+ κC)− (at + 1)dFB(θ).
Notice that (by integrating by parts):
∫ θ
θ̂(at)
2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dFJ(θ) =
(




2(1− β)θ̂(at) + κ







By definition of θ̂(at), 2(1 − β)θ̂(at) + κ
































FB(θ)dθ. This directly implies
∫ θ
θ̂(at)
2((1 − β)θ + κC) −
(at + 1)dFA(θ) ≤
∫ θ
θ̂(at)
2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dFB(θ).























−(1 − FJ(θ))dθ =
∫ −θ̂(at)
0
(1 − FJ(θ))dθ (where
the second equality uses the symmetry). Hence,
∫ 0
θ̂(at)





FJ(θ)dθ = −θ̂(at) +
∫ θ
−θ̂(at)










2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dFA(θ) ≤∫ θ
θ̂(at)
2((1− β)θ + κC)− (at + 1)dFB(θ) again.
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Proof of Corollary 2
Throughout, we assume that the executive plays a maximum grab strategy. Before proceeding with
the proof, denote V C(a, 1;κN) the continuation value of a judge with ideal point κC when a judge
with ideal point κN decides on authority extension this period and in the following ones. Note that
V (a, 1) = V C(a, 1;κC). Denote further aN(θ, a) the tolerance threshold of the replacement judge






Using H(·) defined in Equation A.7 and a similar reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 3, it can
easily be shown that aN(θ, a) ≤ a(θ, a) if and only if κN < κC (with strict inequality whenever
θ < θ̂(a;κN)), and aN(θ, a) ≥ a(θ, a) if and only if κN > κC (with strict inequality whenever
θ < θ̂(a;κC)).
Ignoring all arguments but κN , When the court is not changing hands, the tolerance threshold is
defined by:
−(a− θ − κC)2 + β
Eθ
(
− (a− θ − κC)2
)
1− β
= −(a− θ − κC)2 + βV (a, 1)
In turn, the tolerance threshold of a judge about to be replaced—denoted a(κN) when other argu-
ments are ignored—is defined by:
−(a− θ − κC)2 + β
Eθ
(
− (a− θ − κC)2
)
1− β
= −(a(κN)− θ − κC)2 + βV C(a(κN), 1;κN)
We can show using a similar reasoning as in the proof of Lemma A.4 that V C(·) exists and is
continuous. Note that a = 1 whenever θ ≥ θ̂(a;κC) whether or not the judge is replaced since






. We focus on the cases when θ < θ̂(a;κC) in what follows.
We first show that V C(a, 1;κN) < V (a, 1) for all a ∈ [0, 1) when κN > κC . To do so, suppose that
when the set of precedents is [0, a], the justice characterised by ideal point κC is forced to accept
authority claim aN(θ, a) in that period before the game resuming as normal. Her continuation











θ − κC)2 + βV (1, 1)
)
dF (θ). Given aN > a and using the proof of Lemma A.3, Vˆ (a, 1) < V (a, 1).
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Repeating the process, we obtain that:




− (aN(θ, a)− κC − θ)2
+ β
(∫ θ̂(aN (θ,a);κN )
−θ
(














− (1− θ − κC)2 + βV (1, 1)
)
dF (θ)
Note that in this process, the authority claim implemented in two subsequent periods is the same
as if the court is controlled by a judge with ideal point κN and the incumbent plays a maximum
grab strategy, before a judge with ideal point κC takes control again. Hence, repeating the process
again k times with k very large (and using the fact that we have continuity at infinity with the
discount factor β), we can get arbitrarily close to V C(a, 1;κN). Since inequalities are all strict
along the way, we obtain V (a, 1) > V C(a, 1;κN).







= −(at− θ− κ
C)2+







> −(at − θ − κ
C)2 + βV (at, 1).









N) for all at ≥ a. Hence, it must
be that a(κN) < a as claimed.
We now show that V N(a, 1;κN) > V (a, 1) for all a ∈ [0, 1) and κN < κC . Adapting the proof






2((1 − β)θ + κN) − (aN(θ, a) + 1)dF (θ) = 0 and it is strictly increasing with
κN . Now, for all κN ∈ [0, κC) and all θ < θ̂(a, κN) (so aN(θ, a) ∈ (a, 1)), we can rewrite (ignoring
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arguments in the tolerance threshold, i.e. aN = aN(θ, a)):






2((1− β)θ + κC)− (aN + 1)dF (θ)






2((1− β)θ + κC)− (aN + 1)dF (θ)
−
[






2((1− β)θ + κN)− (aN + 1)dF (θ)
]









∫ θ̂(aN ;κN )
θ̂(aN ;κC)
2((1− β)θ + κC)− (aN + 1)dF (θ)
> 0
The second equality uses the fact that HN(aN(θ, a); θ, a) = 0. The third equality comes from the





decreasing with κ and κC > κN . The inequality comes from κC > κN
and 2((1− β)θ + κC)− (aN + 1) > 0 for all θ ≥ θ̂(aN ;κC).
Hence, for all κN ∈ [0, κC), H(aN ; θ, a) > 0. Now, using the exact same process as for the case when
κN > κC , but with reversed inequalities, we can show that V C(a, 1;κN) > V (a, 1). Then, using the
same reasoning as above, it can be checked that this inequality and the properties of the tolerance
threshold imply that a(θ, a;κN) ≥ a(θ, a) with strict inequality whenever θ < θ̂(a;κC).
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B Proofs for Section 4
Political turnover and executive power
Proof of Proposition 4
Denote WJ(θ, a, 1, K) the continuation value of politician J ∈ {Pl, Pr} when the state is θ, the
maximum of the permissible range is a (maxRt = a), no previous claim has been overturned,
and politician K ∈ {Pl, Pr} is in office (assuming the existence). Let a
∗(θ, a, 1, K) a prescribed
equilibrium authority acquisition when the state is θ, maxRt = a, and K ∈ {Pl, Pr} is in office.
To prove the result, we first suppose that there exists a ∈ [0, 1] and θ such that the office-holder’s
equilibrium strategy satisfies d(a∗(θ, a, 1, J), θ, a, 1) = 1. That is, there exists some authority stock
and some state of the world so that the incumbent oversteps her authority so as the court over-
turns the authority grab and blocks future grab. We show that there exists a profitable deviation
whenever π is sufficiently close below to 1/2.
To do so, suppose that for some t ≥ 1, Pl (the reasoning is parallel for Pr) is in power with authority
stock a and the state is θ. If Pl follows her prescribed strategy, her expected payoff is:
WPl(θ, a, a, Pl) = v(a) + βπWPl(θ, a, a, Pl) + β(1− π)WPl(θ, a, a, Pr) (B.1)
Similarly,
WPl(θ, a, a, Pr) = −v(a) + βπWPl(θ, a, a, Pr) + β(1− π)WPl(θ, a, a, Pl) (B.2)
Simple computation then yields:
WPl(θ, a, a, Pl) = v(a) + β
(2π − 1)
1− β(2π − 1)
v(a) (B.3)
Using a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown that there exists
a(θ, a) such that the court upholds the executive action if a ≤ a(θ, a).18 Given the prescribed
18Recall that we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Hence, the court only considers the state variables in its
decision—(a) the identity of the current officeholder (which is inconsequential), (b) the authority stock a, and (c)
the state θt—taking into future players’ strategies.
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equilibrium strategy (the court must overturn Pl’s claim), obviously, a(θ, a) < 1. Consider the
following deviation strategy by Pl. In period t, Pl chooses ât = a(θ, a). Then, in period t + k,
k ≥ 1, for each possible authority stock at+k and state of the world θt+k, Pl when in office chooses
the same authority grab as Pr would if in power and denote this value ât+k(θt+k, at+k). Notice that
for this particular deviation, we do not make any prediction about how Pr and the court react to
the deviation strategy proposed. The reaction, however, is well defined since we assume that the
equilibrium exists and we just look for a necessary condition for its existence.19
Denote ât+k the realized authority acquisition in period t+k and noting that it is fully determined
by previous states of the world, the expected payoff from the prescribed deviation is:
ŴPl(θ, a, 1, Pl) =v(a(θ, a)) + βπEθt+1
(




ŴPl(θt+1, a(θ, a), 1, Pr)
)
(B.4)
Note that under the assumed deviation (ignoring arguments whenever possible):
Eθt+1
(




v(â(θt+1, a) + βπEθt+2
(













− v(â(θt+1, a) + βπEθt+2
(















+ β(2π − 1)Eθt+1,θt+2
(
ŴPl(θt+2, ât+1, 1, Pl)− ŴPl(θt+2, ât+1, 1, Pr)
)
,
19Notice that the one-shot deviation principle does not necessarily holds in this setting since the game is not a
proper infinitely-repeated game due to the variations in the authority stock a and state of the world θ.
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where Eθt+1,θt+2 (·) denotes iterated expectations.
Using the equation above, we can extend the series to obtain:
Eθt+1
(














with ât+k standing for ât+k(θt+k, ât+k−1).


































Denoting ât+1 = â(θt+1, a), we thus obtain:
ŴPl(θ, a, 1, Pl) =v(a(θ, a)) +
∞∑
k=1









ât+1 > a and a > a. Suppose π < 1/2, then note that (2π − 1)
k is negative for k odd and positive
for k even. So we have
ŴPl(θ, a, 1, Pl) > v(a(θ, a)) +
∞∑
k=0








βk(2π − 1)kv(a) ≥ v(a(θ, a)) +
∞∑
k=0





For all θ and a, there exists ε(θ, a) > 0 such that v(a(θ, a))−v(a) > ε(θ, a). Further, by assumption
β < 1. Hence, there exists π´(a, θ) < 1/2 such that this necessary condition is satisfied only if
π ≥ π´(a, θ).
Denote π` = mina∈[0,1),θ∈[−θ,θ] π´(a, θ). From the reasoning above, π` < 1/2. Since we have only looked
at a single possible deviation, there exists π ≤ π` < 1/2 such that any equilibrium in which d(·) = 0
with positive probability exists only if π ≤ π. The contrapositive then proves the claim.
Alternative judicial rule
Before proving Proposition 5, it is useful to consider the following modified maximization problem.
We study the court ’s choice of a new authority claim under the constraint that the authority
choice each period must satisfy at ≥ maxRt (i.e., this is equivalent to the court choosing when to
increase authority, but the incumbent deciding how much authority to use each period). In this
amended problem, we use ·˘ to denote the associated continuation value and equilibrium choices.
More specifically, facing with a state θ, the court’s equilibrium choice is denoted a˘(θ, a, aR) under
the conditions of the lemma (maxRt = a and minWt = a
R).
Lemma B.1. Suppose maxRt = a ∈ [0, 1), minWt = a
R ∈ (a, 1], and the court decides the
increase in authority claim under the constraint at ≥ maxRt. Then
(i) the court never imposes additional constraint on itself: minWt′ = a
R for all t′ ≥ t;
(ii) there exists a unique θT (a) < θ such that for all θt ≤ θ
T (a), the court keeps authority constant
in period t: a˘(θt, a, a
R) = a;
(iii) there exists a unique θM(aR) ∈ (θT (a), θ) such that for all θt ≥ θ
M(aR), the court extends
authority to its maximum in period t: a˘(θt, a, a
R) = aR;
(iv) For all θt ∈ (θ





(θt − θ˜)dF (θ˜).
Proof. We first look at the court’s maximization problem when it does not impose constraint on
itself. That is, the court’s maximization problem is:
max
a′∈[a,aR]
− (a′ − κC − θ)2 + V˘ (a′, aR)
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We suppose that the court then plays a threshold strategy: pick a˘(θ, a, aR) = a if and only if
θ ≤ θT (a), for some θT (a), and choose some authority a˘(θ, a, aR) > a otherwise. We verify that
this is the case below.
Under the prescribed strategy, using a similar reasoning as in the proof of Lemma A.4, the contin-
uation value V˘ (·, ·) exists, is differentiable, concave, with continuous derivative. Further, it equals,
for all a′, aR:
V˘ (a′, aR) =
∫ θT (a′)
−θ
−(a′−κC−θ˜)2+βV˘ (a′, aR)dF (θ˜)+
∫ θ
θT (a′)
−(a˘(θ˜, a′, aR)−κC−θ˜)2+βV (a˘(θ˜, a′, aR), aR)dF (θ˜),
with a˘(θ, a′, aR) = argmaxa′′∈[a′,aR] − (a
′′ − κC − θ)2 + βV˘ (a′′, aR).
Denote V˘(a′, θ, a) = −(a′ − κC − θ)2 + βV˘ (a′, aR). Denoting partial derivative with respect to the
ith argument by the usual subscript, we obtain
V˘1(a














− (a′ − κC − θT (a′))2 + βV˘ (a′, aR)
−
(
− (a˘(θT (a′), a′, aR)− κC − θT (a′))2 + βV˘ (a˘(θT (a′), a′, aR), aR)
))





−2(a′ − κC − θ˜) + βV˘1(a
′, aR)dF (θ˜)
Observe that if V˘1(a
′, θ, a) < 0 for all a′ > a, the court’s optimal claim is a˘(θ, a, aR) = a. The
condition is equivalent to
(a′ − κC − θ) + β
∫ θT (a′)
−θ
(a′ − κC − θ˜)dF (θ˜)
1− βF (θT (a′))
> 0
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After rearranging, we obtain
(a′ − κC − θ) + β
∫ θT (a′)
−θ
(θ − θ˜)dF (θ˜) > 0
In turn, a˘(θ, a, aR) is an interior solution (a′ ∈ (a, aR)), if there exists a solution to V˘1(a
′, θ, a) = 0,
or equivalently to
a′ = θ + κC − β
∫ θT (a′)
−θ
(θ − θ˜)dF (θ˜) (B.8)
Finally, a˘(θ, a, aR) = aR if V˘1(a
′, θ, a) ≥ 0 for all a′ ∈ [a, aR].
We now show that for all a ∈ [0, aR], there exists a unique θT (a) such that V˘1(a
′, θ, a) < 0 for all
a′ ≥ a if and only if θ ≤ θT (a). Consider the function H(θ, θT ) = θ−κC−β
∫ θT
−θ
(θ− θ˜)dF (θ˜). Notice
that H1(θ, θ
T ) > 0 and H2(θ, θ
T ) < 0. We now show that there exists a unique θT (a) ∈ (−θ, θ)




(θT − θ˜)dF (θ˜). The function h(·) has the following properties:
(a) h′(θT ) = 1− βF (θT ) > 0 for all θT ∈ [−θ, θ];
(b) h(−θ) = −θ + κC < 0 since θ > 1/(1− β) > 1 and κC ≤ 1;
(c) h(θ) = (1− β)θ + κC > 1 under the assumption.
Combining the three properties, by the theorem of intermediate values, there exists a unique
θT (a) ∈ (−θ, θ) such that for all a ∈ [0, 1], h(θT (a)) = a. Further, θT (a) is strictly increasing with
a by the implicit function theorem.
Given that H(θ, θT ) is strictly increasing in its first argument and strictly decreasing in its second
argument, this implies that H(θ, θT (a)) ≤ a if and only if θ ≤ θT (a). Further, a′−H(θ, θT (a′)) > 0
for all a′ > a if and only if θ ≤ θT (a). Consequently, for all θ ≤ θT (a), a˘(θ, a, aR) = a as claimed
(this proves point (ii) of the lemma).
We now show that there exists θM(aR) ∈ (−θ, θ) such that a˘(θ, a, aR) = aR for all θ ≥ θM(aR)
(i.e., V˘1(a
′, θ, a) ≥ 0 for all a′ ∈ [a, aR]). To see this, recall that for all a, θT (a) is defined as:
a = θT (a) + κC −
∫ θT (a)
−θ
(θT (a)− θ˜)dF (θ˜). Hence, for all θ ≥ θT (a), we can rewrite Equation B.8 as
θT (a′) + κC − β
∫ θT (a′)
−θ
(θT (a′)− θ˜)dF (θ˜) = θ + κC − β
∫ θT (a′)
−θ
(θ − θ˜)dF (θ˜),
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which implies that θ = θT (a′). As a result, the court’s equilibrium choice satisfies for all θ ≥ θT (a)
a˘(θ, a, aR) = min
{
θ + κC −
∫ θ
−θ
(θ − θ˜)dF (θ˜), aR
}
(B.9)
Recall that θ+ κC −
∫ θ
−θ
(θ− θ˜)dF (θ˜) = h(θ), h(θ) > 1, and h(·) is strictly increasing. Hence, there
exists a unique θM(aR) such that for all θ ≥ θM(aR), the court picks a˘(θ, a, aR) = aR. This proves
point (iii). Point (iv) then follows from Equation B.9.
Finally, note that the court would never choose to increase the impermissible set if it decides upon
new claim. Indeed, the court can, if it chooses so, constraint herself and never to go over a certain
authority claim âR < aR without having to increase the impermissible set. Since it chooses not to
do with positive probability by the reasoning above, the court must be strictly better off without
imposing additional constraint on itself. Hence, the optimal choice of the court under the constraint
at ≥ maxRt is as defined in the text of the lemma.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 5. Throughout, we assume that continuation values exist
since we focus on the properties of equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof proceeds in several steps. In step 1, we show the existence of θ̂L (a, aR). In step 2, we
show that θ̂L (a, aR) is unique. In step 3, we demonstrate that there exists a(θ, a, aR) > a such that
the court upholds all authority claims satisfying at ≤ a(θ, a, a
R) in all states of the world.
Step 1. From Lemma B.1, we know that when the court chooses the extent of authority extension in
period t, there exists θM(aR) such that for all θt ≥ θ
M(aR), the court chooses a˘(θt, a, a
R) = aR (recall
that ·˘ denotes equilibrium choice, continuation values in the modified maximization problem).
That is, for all a′ ∈ [a, aR), we have: −(a′ − θt)
2 + βVˇ (a′, aR) < −(aR − θt)
2 + βVˇ (aR, aR).
Because in our model the incumbent, not the court, is deciding upon the authority extension,
it must be that Vˇ (a′, aR) ≥ V (a′, aR). Further, from point (iv) of Lemma B.1, we know that
the court never restricts itself. Hence, the court’s continuation value is always lower with the
incumbent deciding on authority extension than when it chooses the new claim each period. In






. Consequently, whenever the court prefers aR under
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the amended maximization problem, it also prefers aR to all other authority claims when the
executive is deciding on the extension of authority. That is, for all θt ≥ θ
M(aR), d(θt, at, a, a
R) = 0
for all at ∈ [a, a
R]. This proves existence of a threshold and concludes step 1.
Step 2. To show uniqueness, notice that the court prefers to uphold a claim aR rather than
overturning it whenever
−(aR − θ)2 + βV (aR, aR) ≥ −(a− θ)2 + βV (a, aR)
⇔ (a− aR)(a+ aR − 2θ) ≥ β
(
V (a, aR)− V (aR, aR)
)
The function (a− aR)(a+ aR − 2θ) is strictly increasing with θ. Hence, if there exists θl such that
(a− aR)(a+ aR − 2θl) ≥ β
(
V 0(a, aR)− V 0(aR, aR)
)





for all θ > θl. Hence, θ̂L (a, aR) is necessarily unique.
Step 3. We now show that there exists ǫ > 0 such that for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ], defining a′ = a + ǫ,
−(a′−κC−θ)2+βV (a′, aR) ≥ −(a−κC−θ)2+βV (a, a′) (i.e., the court upholds any a′ ∈ (a, a+ ǫ].
This is equivalent to show that 2ǫ(a + ǫ
2
− θ − κC) ≤ β(V (a + ǫ, aR) − V (a, a + ǫ)). Now, we can
rewrite V (a + ǫ, aR) − V (a, a + ǫ) = (V (a + ǫ, aR) − V (a, a)) − (V (a, a + ǫ) − V (a, a)). Using a
similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, given steps 1 and 2, we know that there exist
ǫ̂ > 0 such that for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ̂), V (a+ ǫ, aR)− V (a, a) is bounded below away from zero. Further,
denote θ∗(a) = a − κC and note that V (a, a + ǫ) < F (θ∗(a))Eθ(−(a−θ−κ
C)2|θ≤θ∗(a))
1−β
+ (F (θ∗(a +
ǫ)) − F (θ∗(a))) × 0 + (1 − F (θ∗(a + ǫ))Eθ(−(a+ǫ−θ−κ
C)2|θ≥θ∗(a))
1−β
(the right-hand side is the court’s
payoff if it can choose the optimal at ∈ [a, a + ǫ] for itself each period without any effect on
precedent, the inequality is strict since if at = a + ǫ in some period t, at′(θ) = a + ǫ for all θ








upper bound is continuous in ǫ and converge to 0 as ǫ → 0. Hence, there exists ǫ´ > 0 such that
there exists ψ > 0 such that for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ´), (V (a+ ǫ, aR)−V (a, a))− (V (a, a+ ǫ)−V (a, a)) ≥ ψ.
Given that 2ǫ(a + ǫ
2
− θ − κC) is continuous in ǫ and converges to 0 as ǫ → 0, there exists ǫ > 0,
such that for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ), 2ǫ(a+ ǫ
2
− θ − κC) ≤ β(V (a+ ǫ, aR)− V (a, a+ ǫ)).
54
C Additional results: Turnover with party-dependent prob-
ability of election
As in Subsection 4.1, we assume that at the beginning of each period, before θt is realised, Nature
determines the identity of the officeholder, which can be either Pl or Pr. Following a long tradition
in the literature (e.g., Persson and Svensson, 1989), in this Appendix, the probability of being
in office is party-dependent. It is common knowledge that the probability that Pr is selected by
Nature is i.i.d. over time and is equal to π ≥ 1/2 each period.
Like in the main text, the utility function of politician J ∈ {Pl, Pr},
UJ(yt) =

v(yt) if J is in office
−v(yt) otherwise
The rest of the model remains unchanged. In particular, we assume that the court cares only about
constitutional considerations and the state of the world (i.e., the court’s ideal level of authority κC
does not depend on the officeholder’s identity).
As before, the court’s problem remains the same as in the baseline model, and ny constraint on
authority can only come from change of personnel in office. Our first result shows that electoral
competition in itself is not sufficient to curb the growth of executive authority. Whenever the
election is well balanced (i.e., Pl’s chances of getting into office are not so different than Pr’s), in
any equilibrium, executive authority grows to it highest feasible level.
Proposition C.1. There exists π > 1/2 such that if π ∈ [1/2, π), any equilibrium satisfies
lim
t→∞
Rt = [0, 1] with probability 1.
Before the identity of the officeholder is revealed, Pl would like to commit to curb the authority
of the executive office, since her chances of winning are low. Once she assumes office, however, this
commitment proves untenable. At that time, after all, Pl trades off the present benefit of having
more authority to implement her preferred policy and the future cost of ceding more authority
prospectively to her opponent. When the likelihood that Pl remains in power is not too low
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relative to Pr’s, however, the present benefit of increased authority dominates the future cost, and
Pl always chooses an authority claim that is upheld by the court.
Proposition C.1 suggests that Pl may choose to constrain the executive if she is electorally
disadvantaged but wins office unexpectedly. The next result stipulates this fact formally. When Pr
is sufficiently likely to return to office in the next period, at the first possible opportunity Pl will
choose to constrain the authority of the executive office by soliciting a court rejection.
Proposition C.2. If β > 1/2, there exists π′ ≥ π such that if π > π′, in equilibrium, an electorally
disadvantaged officeholder Pl chooses an action that is overturned by the court whenever possible
(formally, chooses an authority claim at such that dt(at, θt,Rt,Wt) = 1 whenever θt < θ̂(a)).
The possibility of political turnover can serve as a constraint on the executive when the judi-
ciary itself has no effect. The judicial constraint is only secondary because the court cannot impose
limits on executive authority on its own. It needs to be presented with a policy it deems suffi-
ciently unsatisfactory today to overturn it, despite its loss of future flexibility. But with strategic
officeholders, this happens only if there is the possibility of turnover.
The possibility of political turnover is necessary, but not sufficient. As we stressed above, limits
on executive authority arise in equilibrium only if a highly disadvantaged party or candidate, by
chance, rises to power. When electoral competition is well balanced, the officeholder, whatever her
identity, increases the scope of authority to do more today. Further, the complexity of the model
does not allow us to rule out the possibility that a disadvantaged Pl claims full authority today
whenever circumstances permit (i.e., θt ≥ θ̂(a)).
20 Hence, even a highly disadvantaged politician
may choose to claim new authority.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition C.1
To prove the proposition, we denote WJ(θ, a, 1, K) the continuation value of politician J ∈ {Pl, Pr}
when the state is θ, the maximum of the permissible range is a (maxRt = a), no previous claim has
20The choice for Pl is then (broadly speaking) between waiting by making no authority claim or obtaining full
authority for the office. Since the payoff from waiting is indeterminate absent further assumptions (especially,
regarding Pr’s strategy), it becomes difficult to judge which of the two choices provides the highest expected payoff.
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been overturned, and politician K ∈ {Pl, Pr} is in office (assuming the existence). Let a
∗(θ, a, 1, K)
a prescribed equilibrium authority acquisition when the state is θ, maxRt = a, and K ∈ {Pl, Pr}
is in office.
To prove the result, we first suppose that there exists a ∈ [0, 1] and θ such that Pl’s equilibrium
strategy satisfies d(a∗(θ, a, 1, Pl), θ, a, 1) = 1. That is, there exists some authority stock and some
state of the world so that the left-wing incumbent oversteps her authority so as the court overturns
the authority grab and blocks future grab. We show that there exists a profitable deviation when-
ever π is sufficiently close to 1/2.
To do so, suppose that for some t ≥ 1, Pl is in power with authority stock a and the state is θ. If
Pl follows her prescribed strategy, her expected payoff is:
WPl(θ, a, a, Pl) = v(a)−
β
1− β
(2π − 1)v(a). (C.1)
Using a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be shown that there exists
a(θ, a) such that the court upholds the executive action if a ≤ a(θ, a).21 Given the prescribed
equilibrium strategy (the court must overturn Pl’s claim), obviously, a(θ, a) < 1. Consider the
following deviation strategy by Pl. In period t, Pl chooses ât = a(θ, a). Then, in period t + k,
k ≥ 1, for each possible authority stock at+k and state of the world θt+k, Pl when in office chooses
the same authority grab as Pr would if in power and denote this value ât+k(θt+k, at+k). Notice that
for this particular deviation, we do not make any prediction about how Pr and the court react to
the deviation strategy proposed. The reaction, however, is well defined since we assume that the
equilibrium exists and we just look for a necessary condition for its existence.22
Denote ât+k the realized authority acquisition in period t+k and noting that it is fully determined
21Recall that we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Hence, the court only considers the state variables in its
decision—(a) the identity of the current officeholder (which is inconsequential), (b) the authority stock a, and (c)
the state θt—taking into future players’ strategies.
22Notice that the one-shot deviation principle does not necessarily holds in this setting since the game is not a
proper infinitely-repeated game due to the variations in the authority stock a and state of the world θ.
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by previous states of the world, the expected payoff from the prescribed deviation is:
ŴPl(θ, a, 1, Pl) =v(a(θ, a)) + βEθt+1
(




π(−v(ât+2(θt+2, ât+1)))) + (1− π)v(ât+2(θt+1, ât+1)))
)
+ . . .








Notice that Pl’s expected payoff from deviating is decreasing with v(ât+k(·)) in each subsequent pe-




v(a(θ, a))− (2π − 1) β
1−β
v(1).
Consequently, a necessary condition for the postulated equilibrium to exist is:
v(a(θ, a))− v(a)− (2π − 1)
β
1− β
(v(1)− v(a)) ≤ 0








. such that this necessary condition is never satisfied if
π < π̂(a, θ). Given β < 1 and there exists ε(a, θ) > 0 such that v(a(θ, a)) − v(a) > ε(a, θ) (by
Proposition 1), π̂(a, θ) > 1
2
.
Denote ̂̂π(a, θ) = mina∈[0,1),θ∈[−θ,θ] π̂(a, θ). From the reasoning above, ̂̂π(a, θ) > 1/2. Given that we
have only looked at one possible deviation, there exists π ≥ ̂̂π(a, θ) such that any equilibrium in
which d(·) = 0 with positive probability exists only if π ≥ π. The contrapositive then proves the
claim.
Proof of Proposition C.2
Notice that by a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, the court upholds at = 1 if and
only if θt ≥ θ̂(a) or a = 1. To prove the result, we thus need to show that for all θt < θ̂(a), Pl
when in office proposes at such that dt(at, θt, a, 1) = 1 (existence of such action is guaranteed since
at = 1 is overturned).
Still using WJ(θt, a,K) to denote the continuation value of J ∈ {Pl, Pr} when K ∈ {Pl, Pr} is in
office facing state of the world θt and permissible set [0, a], this is equivalent to showing that for
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all a′ ≥ a such that dt(a




(2π − 1)v(a) ≥ v(a′) + βπEθ(WPl(θ, a
′, Pr)) + β(1− π)Eθ(WPl(θ, a
′, Pl)) (C.3)
We now find an upper bound on Pl’s payoff when Pr is in office. To do so, denote π = 1 − δ,












. This is equivalent
to assume that when Pr is in power, she makes an authority claim at = 1 whenever possible or
stays put otherwise. In turn, when Pl is in power, she obtains her highest possible continuation
value.














For δ sufficiently small, a similar reasoning as in the proof of Lemma A.1 yields that Pr chooses
at = 1 whenever possible and weakly grows her authority otherwise. Therefore, WPl(θ, a
′, Pr) <
W Pr(δ). It can easily be checked that, v(a) − β
1−β
v(a) > v(a′) + βW Pr(0) (since β > 1/2). Since
W Pr(·) is continuous and weakly increasing in δ (since by definition W ≥ −v(a′)/1− β), we must
have that there exists δ > 0 such that v(a) − β
1−β
(1 − 2δ)v(a) > v(a′) + β(1 − δ)W Pr(δ) + βδW
for all δ < δ and all a′ ≥ a not overturned. Since v(a′) + β(1− δ)W Pr(δ) + βδW is a strict upper
bound on Pl’s expected payoff from not being overruled, there exists π < 1 such as being overruled
whenever θt < θ̂(a) is indeed an equilibrium strategy.
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